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LIMITATIONS UPON THE USE OF
COMPULSORY UNION DUES
MICHAEL E. MERRILL*
I. INTRODUCTION-FACTORS OF CURRENT IMPORTANCE
N THE early 1960's, two Supreme Court decisions' were ren-
dered which, because of constitutional infirmities, came close to
invalidating the "union shop" provisions of the Railway Labor Act
This result was avoided only by the explication of a statutory in-
terpretation which is at war, with the literal terms of the Act. The
effect of these decisions was to foreclose, over protest, unions from
using dissenters' compulsory dues and fees for political purposes.
This proscriptive condition is not expressed in the statute.
In the ensuing years, the import of Street and Allen has achieved
immense consequence. Curiously, this has taken place in a near-
vacuum of litigation and until very recently no other union action
has responded to the rationale of those decisions. As stated by a
self-described union devotee:'
Frankly, I have not been able to ascertain in precisely what man-
ner any of the railroad unions have made an accommodation to
the principle enunciated in the Street and Allen decisions ....
The foregoing comment was written in 1969. Not until 1973 was
further litigation begun against a railway union to enforce rights
* B.A., University of Miami, 1962, J.D., University of Missouri, Kansas City,
School of Law, 1966, LL.M., Labor Law, The George Washington University,
1976. The author is engaged in the practice of labor law in San Diego, California,
and is chief counsel in Ellis v. BRAC, discussed herein.
'International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Brother-
hood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
245 U.S.C. §5 151-88 (1970) [hereinafter RLA].
sGromfine, Union Security Clauses in Public Employment, N.Y. UNIV.
TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL CONF. ON LABOR 285 (1970).
4 Id. at 296.
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established by those earlier cases.' In the interim, two other law-
suits' were filed challenging compulsory unionism provisions of
collective bargaining agreements negotiated pursuant to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.' Neither of those decisions ventured
beyond the area of political spending, but it is now reasonably well
settled that the authority of Street applies to compulsory unionism
agreements authorized by the NLRA.!
Measured against this unimpressive volume of litigation, one
might superficially conclude that the consequences of the afore-
mentioned cases are innocuous. Plainly, spokesmen for organized
labor would vociferously disagree. One prominent union attorney
responded to a recent trial court decision in the Ellis' case with this
emphatic statement: "[T]he ruling, if upheld, 'would in effect repeal
the union shop.' .'". Such concerns are intensified by the fact that
rival labor unions are joining the fray, scrapping for the privilege
of extracting compulsory dues from each other's members. This
occurrence is most visible in the intense competition between the
National Education Association and the American Federation of
Teachers, in which the victor generally seeks to obtain "union
security" contractual language compelling the payment of equiva-
lent dues and fees from its opponent's members, as well as from
any unaffiliated teachers. This has in turn led to litigation challeng-
ing statutory procedures implementing such dues collections."
Disputes over union security provisions applicable to public
employees augment the importance of the private sector cases dis-
Ellis v. BRAC, 91 L.R.R.M. 2339 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 1976).
'Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1970) [herein-
after Seay I], further proceedings, 371 F. Supp. 754 (C.D. Cal. 1973), rev'd,
533 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1976) [hereinafter Seay II]; Reid v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 443 F.2d 408 (10th Cir. 1971) [hereinafter Reid I], later proceedings
sub nom. Reid v. United Auto Workers, 80 L.R.R.M. 2886 (N.D. Okla. 1972),
afl'd, 479 F.2d 517 (10th Cir.) [hereinafter Reid II], cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076
(1973).
729 U.S.C. § 141-87 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) [hereinafter NLRA].
I Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996, 1003, and 533 F.2d 1126,
1128 n.3 (9th Cir. 1976); Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 316 F. Supp. 1369, 1371
(D. Mass. 1970), afl'd, 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971);
but see Reid 11, 479 F.2d at 519-20.
991 L.R.R.M. 2339 (S.D. Cal. 1976).
"Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1976, at 4, col. 4.
"Robbinsdale Educ. Ass'n v. Robbinsdale Fed'n of Teachers, Local 872, 239
N.W.2d 437 (Minn.), vacated sub nom. Threlkeld v. Robbinsdale Fed'n of Teach-
ers, Local 872, 97 S. Ct. 225 (1976).
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cussed above for yet another reason. Numerous public employee
statutes purport to limit the costs that can be imposed upon dis-
senters to those of "negotiating and administering an agreement,"'"
to the "proportionate share of the costs of the collective bargaining
process and contract administration,"" or the like. Thus the demar-
cation of that category of union activities which may be loosely
termed "collective bargaining" activities poses a critical bearing
upon the negotiation and enforcement of union security agreements
both in public and private sector employment.
In general, this article will be limited to the authorities applic-
able to private sector employment. To the extent that those authori-
ties are rendered in response to constitutional strictures, they apply
with full force to the public sector. The converse may not be true;
it has been seriously suggested that any compulsory union fees in
public sector employment are unconstitutional, as they amount to
forced political participation."' Several actions are underway which
assert the proposition that a public employee union is an inherently
political organization, and that the First and Fifth Amendments to
the United States Constitution foreclose compulsory payments to
such an organization."
This article, then, will survey the major elements considered
when weighing the legality of compulsory financial support of a
labor union. As the definitive litigation has been framed in the con-
text of the Railway Labor Act, primary attention will be devoted
to that statute. The discussion, however, is fully applicable to con-
troversies arising under the National Labor Relations Act."
12 HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-4 (Supp. 1975).
'WIS. STATS. S l11.70(1)(h) (1973).
"Blair, Union Security Agreements in Public Employment, 60 CORNELL L.
REv. 183, 194-96 (1975).
15 Knight v. Alsop, 535 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1976); Jensen v. Yonamine, No.
74-405 (D. Hawaii, filed Dec. 3, 1975).
'
6 Seay I, 427 F.2d at 1003, comparing the "union shop" provisions of the
two statutes: "Both the applicable provision of that Act [the RLA]-45 U.S.C.
§ 152, Eleventh-and the applicable provision of the [NLRA]-29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(3) are for all purposes here, the same." In its later decision in Seay II,
533 F.2d at 1128 n.3, the Ninth Circuit stated that:
While the holdings of Street and Allen turned on a construction of
the provisions of section 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act,
45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh, this court has held that the holdings of
these cases are equally applicable to the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). Thus it is immaterial that the NLRA
19761
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II. THE NATURE OF THE OBLIGATION AUTHORIZED
BY FEDERAL STATUTES
A. Misleading Statutory Terminology
The genesis of continuing confusion with regard to the nature
and extent of compulsory unionism obligations authorized by the
NLRA and the RLA lies in the deceptive terminology used in those
statutes.
In section 7,1' the NLRA assures employees of the right to re-
frain from forming, joining, or assisting labor organizations. This
assurance of independence is qualified by an authorization of col-
lective bargaining agreement provisions requiring "membership"
in the labor organization holding certification as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative." A host of decisions ' has uniformly re-
buffed union efforts to enforce the literal wording of the statute,
thereby avoiding the certain constitutional difficulties that would
afflict implementation of the common meaning of membership."
The Supreme Court tersely limited the obligation contemplated by
Congress to that of financial support:
Under the second proviso to § 8(a) (3), the burdens of member-
ship upon which employment may be conditioned are expressly
limited to the payment of initiation fees and monthly dues. It is
permissible to condition employment upon membership, but mem-
bership, insofar as it has significance to employment rights, may
in turn be conditioned only upon payment of fees and dues.
'Membership' as a condition of employment is whittled down to
its financial core."
rather than the Railway Labor Act is involved in the present
litigation.
1729 U.S.C. 157 (1970).
1829 U.S.C. S 158(a)(3) (1970).
9NLRB v. Hershey Foods Corp., 513 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975); Boiler-
makers Local 749 v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 343, 344-45 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 926 (1973); NLRB v. Zoe Chem. Co., 406 F.2d 574, 579 (2d Cir.
1969); NLRB v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 273 F.2d 272, 275-76 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960); NLRB v. Technicolor Motion Picture Corp.,
248 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1957); NLRB v. Pape Broadcasting Co., 217 F.2d 197,
199-200 (5th Cir. 1954); Haggard, A Clarification of the Types of Union Se-
curity Agreements Affirmatively Permitted by Federal Statutes, 5 RUTGERS-
CAMDEN L.J. 418 (1974).20Good v. Associated Students of the Univ. of Wash., 86 Wash. 2d 94, 542
P.2d 762 (1975).
2INLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963) (emphasis
supplied).
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examples of the tests which should be, but have not been, applied
to them.
Congressional action affecting employee "free riders" was prem-
ised upon its acceptance of the union benefit doctrine." Almost
without exception, appellate courts have unquestioningly accepted
this thesis, without subjecting it to rudimentary analysis. In its
simple and widely accepted form, the thesis is as follows: the union
is obligated to represent equally all employees in the unit in col-
lective bargaining, and all employees benefit from the union's
collective bargaining activities. Conducting these activities is costly,
and it is only fair that the costs are shared equally by all bene-
fiiciaries-voluntary members and dissenters alike. '
As a proposition of logic, this assertion of universal, equal
"benefit" is unprovable. Its acceptance must therefore be premised
upon observable, consistent factual demonstrations. But an infinite
number of commonplace occurrences belie the possibility of sus-
taining the union benefit doctrine by reliance upon such facts.
Even where consistency in collective bargaining results may be
found, the consistency incorporates varying portions of economic
benefit and economic detriment.
If the collective bargaining representative is negotiating a me-
dian wage, there is no doubt that compensation which would
otherwise accrue to a superior worker will be diverted to the mar-
ginal employee. Plainly, employers cannot survive economically
by paying all employees, including the least productive members
of the labor force, at a wage level which can be economically justi-
fied for the most productive employees. If there is any "benefit"
in this circumstance, it is derived by the marginal employee at the
expense of the superior worker.
The notion that all unit employees benefit from union represen-
tation, and that they benefit equally, simply cannot stand up in the
face of union admissions. Virtually every action taken by a union
embodies a conflict of interest."0 The unfavorable connotations of
28 Id. at 761-62; NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 740-41
(1963).
29 NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 740-41 (1963); International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 760-64 (1961); Railway Employes'
Dep't, AFL v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 235, 238 (1956); Gray v. Gulf M. &
O.R.R., 429 F.2d 1064, 1071 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971).
" For a thorough discussion of this point as it relates to the exclusive rep-
COMPULSORY UNION DUES
Comparably obscure wording is found in the Railway Labor
Act. Language was inserted in section 2, Fourth2 in 1934 making
it unlawful "to influence or coerce employees in an effort to induce
them to join or remain or not to join or remain members of any
labor organization," or to withhold or collect union dues or fees
from their wages. In 1951, section 2, Eleventh!' was added," au-
thorizing collective bargaining agreements requiring that "all em-
ployees shall become members of the labor organization repre-
senting their craft or class . . . ." Again, the courts construed
"membership" to mean the payment of dues and fees:
[T]he membership requirements of this contract and of the union
shop statute are merely formal and fictional aside from the financial
obligations.
The unwilling employee need assume no pledge of conformity
nor promise of obedience, nor even make application for member-
ship to retain employment under the union shop contract."'
The pertinent question therefore becomes: to what extent may
the "financial core" of initiation fees, dues and assessments' be
whittled down by the application of constitutional strictures or
other inherent statutory limitations?
B. The "Free Rider" and "Union Benefit" Doctrines
Adequate treatment of the propositions inherent in the "free
rider" and "union benefit" doctrines is impossible herein; this ar-
ticle undertakes a comprehensive survey of the vital factors affect-
ing current litigation in the area of compulsory union financial
support. Extensive economic, historical, sociological, and philo-
sophic studies would be required. Nevertheless, it is possible to
identify some of the central themes of those doctrines, and to pose
2245 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth (1970).
2348 Stat. 1185 (1934).
2445 U.S.C. S 152, Eleventh (1970).
2 64 Stat. 1238 (1951).
"Sandsberry v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 295 S.W.2d 412, 415-16
(Tex. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 918 (1957); accord, Marden v. International
Ass'n of Machinists, 91 L.R.R.M. 2841 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 1976); Haggard,
supra note 19.
"7Unlike the NLRA, the RLA permits charging dissenters for assessments
because of the earlier practice of some railway unions of having nominal dues,
and supporting operating expenses through regularly levied assessments. Inter-
national Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 766 (1961).
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a fiduciary making such a compromise may be expunged by the
implicit assent of one who voluntarily pledges himself as a union
member, but the existence of the conflict is an ineradicable fact.
The taint remains upon actions taken contrary to the interests of
those who resist affiliation, but who, because of statutory powers
granted the exclusive representative, are denied the power to ne-
gotiate their own employment terms and conditions.
Unions have conceded the perennial existence of significant
conflicts of interest. In their brief to the Supreme Court in Street
the appellants stated that:
There is at least as much interference with a man's freedom of
association, freedom of thought, and freedom of speech in requir-
ing him to pay dues to a union which strikes to secure a collective
bargaining agreement for a 35 hour week or compulsory retirement
at age 70 or strict seniority, as in the union activities considered
below. (citations omitted). Compelling financial support of a
union involves just as much if not more infringement on freedom
in the sphere of supporting different policies in negotiating agree-
ments and processing grievances as occurs in the legislative or
political sphere; in the negotiating field the impact of the union's
activities on the individual is direct and binding. Groups of em-
ployees within the same bargaining unit have opposing interests in
seniority, hours of work, piece work as against straight hourly
rates of pay, etc.3
Realistically, it may be said that collective bargaining activi-
ties often benefit some employees; generally at the expense of others.
At times, unions have themselves advanced this proposition. The
Deboles case presented a claim by a group of airline employees
who charged their union and employer with discrimination in
awarding seniority in such a way as to cause the plaintiffs to be
prematurely furloughed. The employees alleged a breach of the
union's duty of fair representation and the employer's complicity
therein. The court observed that "the defendants correctly demon-
strate that a collective bargaining agreement favoring a majority
resentation principle, see Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and
the Interests of Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity be Abolished?, 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 897 (1975).
31 Brief for Appellants at 48-49 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street,
367 U.S. 740 (1961).
1976]
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of union members and disfavoring a minority is a frequent occur-
rence . .
The unforgiveable error in the theory of universal, equal benefit
is that of treating individuals as fungible chattels. The injustice of
this approach is apparent even when consideration is limited to
purely economic factors. When the value of workers' intangible
principles and beliefs is considered along with the economic fac-
tors, it is plain that non-analytical judicial acceptance of the union
benefit theory in its simplistic form is a marked anomaly in a set-
ting of growing judicial concern for numerous employee rights.
The denial of an individual's right to speak for himself, to express
nonconformist opinions, and to be free from forced association is
of course accomplished in the name of democracy. In the eyes of
those espousing the union benefit theory, the majoritarian principle
has achieved absolute supremacy: as the majority of employees
(through the union) are acting to benefit all within the unit, none
may be heard to complain that the "benefit" sought, or obtained,
is in fact a profound detriment.
Examination of judicial treatment of religious belief in two dif-
ferent contents-one in the field of labor relations, and one out-
side of it-demonstrates the incompatibility of the union benefit
principle with firm constitutional authority, insofar as the former
principle operates to grant supervening authority to a majority of
union members.
In the highly respected Barnette' decision, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that a citizen's religious beliefs forbidding participa-
tion in a flag salute are not vulnerable to society's demand that
such person participate in patriotic exercises, even in wartime:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right
to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom
of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."
12 Deboles v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 91 L.R.R.M. 2651 (E.D. Pa. 1976),
currently on appeal to Third Circuit, No. 76-1535.
"'West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).34 d., 319 U.S. at 638 (emphasis supplied).
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The pre-eminent status of religious liberty recognized in Bar-
nette has not received even token consideration in labor relations
law, because of the overwhelming effect accorded the majoritarian
principle.
As an example of the subjugation of individual interests for the
supposed accomplishment of group harmony, one may review the
recent decision in Burns v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.'
Plaintiff Bums, following his conversion to the Seventh-day Ad-
ventist faith, refused to continue paying union dues required by
the collective bargaining agreement. Bums' offer to pay equivalent
dues amounts to a non-religious and non-union affiliated charity
was declined,' and the union sought and obtained his discharge.
The court made a specific finding that the union's collective
bargaining efforts had "resulted in substantial employment benefits
to the plaintiff in the form of high wages, job protection, security
and promotional opportunity, health care, safer working conditions,
retirement pay and other incidental employment benefits. .. ."'
Obviously Mr. Bums valued his religious beliefs more than those
employment conditions. Nevertheless, through the exercise of ma-
jority rule, he was required to sacrifice one or the other. Under
those circumstances, it is difficult to ascertain the "benefit" brought
to him by his compulsory bargaining representative. The court did
not rest its analysis solely on the economic advantages accruing to
Bums. The court condemned the notion that Bums be allowed to
observe his religious faith, when that observance would presum-
ably be criticized by those of his fellow workers who were ardent
supporters of compulsory unionism:
The employee hostility, dissension, friction, and consequent loss
of operating efficiency and safety which would result if plaintiff
were to receive the benefits of collective bargaining without paying
his fair share of its costs would undoubtedly result in undue hard-
ship on Southern Pacific .... The testimony of both management
and union witnesses, based on experience, established that the hos-
tility generated by the 'no bill' or 'free riders' has a substantially
adverse impact on such safety and efficiency. Witness Carl Ball,
Vice-President of Operations for Southern Pacific, testified from an
experience of thirty-nine years in the field, that, in his opinion,
11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1441 (D. Ariz. 1976).
1d. at 1444.
37 1d. at 1443.
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the failure to require plaintiff to pay his fair share of the collective
bargaining costs would cause significant employee hostility, dissen-
sion, and lack of communication, resulting in undue hardship to
Southern Pacific in the form of reduced operational efficiency and
safety . . . . Mr. Ball's opinion appears quite sound when con-
sideration is given to the fact that Burns' fellow workers could very
well be expected to have difficulty accepting Burns' sincerity in be-
ing unable in conscience to pay union dues and assessments while
he was able to accept the benefits he shares with his fellow work-
men, made possible by their payment of union dues and asses-
ments.a
This exaltation of workplace attitudes presumably held by a major-
ity of employees over traditionally honored religious principles
fairly illustrates the complexity and the unprovable nature of the
union benefit thesis. In point of fact, the person most critically
affected by the events-plaintiff Bums-obviously determined
that the benefits he received from collective bargaining were of a
lesser magnitude than his spiritual beliefs, as his adherence to the
latter ultimately cost him his job."
I' id. at 1445.
s Although Congress has not had occasion to reexamine the "union benefit"
doctrine in practice, the impetus to make such an examination appears to be
gathering momentum. Not surprisingly, the driving force is Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000, et seq. In light of the congressional em-
phasis upon personal liberties emphasized by that Act, the courts have had to
reexamine their accustomed mechanical application of the "union benefit" doc-
trine, which had uniformly resulted in individual preferences being subjected to
a requirement of financial contribution to the collective representative.
The preeminence of religious principles over supposed worker harmony was
recently presented as an issue for Supreme Court decision. In Cummins v. Parker
Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), the Sixth Circuit held that a worker's
objection to working on Saturdays was a religious belief that required employer
accommodation, absent an unreasonable burden caused by such accommodation.
An equally divided Supreme Court affirmed that decision, Parker Seal Co. v.
Cummins, 97 S. Ct. 342 (1976), providing little guidance with regard to the
relative dominance of the respective interests being litigated. However, in an-
other recent case, issues within the scope of this article are resolved, if only
tentatively. In Cooper v. General Dynamics, 533 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1976), the
plaintiff employees objected to the payment of agency shop fees because such
payment conflicted with their religious tenets. Plaintiffs were Seventh Day Ad-
ventists, and the court accepted their claim of religious objection as genuine.
The court's decision, which was largely predicated upon Congress' 1972 amend-
ments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, departed from the earlier cases, which
had swept aside religious objections to compulsory union payments in order to
combat the supposed menace posed by alleged "free riders." In this decision the
court recognized that in some instances religious principles forbidding payments
to a labor union could be of such consequence as to supersede the agency shop
COMPULSORY UNION DUES
The point of this discussion is simply to engender the realization
that union representation per se cannot benefit every employee;
further, that the degrees of benefit and detriment flowing from such
representation are assuredly not parcelled out in equal measure.
Economic benefits received by an individual employee, as in Burns,
may be offset by tangible or intangible detriments. An employee
may find himself both tangibly and intangibly benefited by union
representation, whereas another worker may find himself entirely
disadvantaged by it.
The Second Circuit has refused to explore the difficult issues
inherent in an analysis of the union benefit doctrine, although
confronted by a record presenting relevant considerations in strik-
ingly clear-cut form. The Buckley 0 case was a challenge to the
lawfulness of compulsory unionism provisions applied to news
commentators whose employment duties unquestionably involve
and depend upon the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.
The plaintiffs, alleged that their constitutional liberties were in-
fringed by forced union support and although the court found that
these claims were not insubstantial or frivolous,' it declined to
resolve them. This result was predicated upon the overriding effect
attributed to the congressional assumption that industrial strife
is minimized by subordinating the exercise of such constitutional
rights to a financial obligation imposed upon dissenters by agree-
ment between union and employer representatives. I shall not dwell
on the values ascribed by the court to these conflicting interests,
as I have already commented upon the irrationality of excluding
intangible factors from assessments of the union benefit doctrines.
The Buckley decision is of even greater interest because of the
court's refusal to undertake any analysis of the economic facts
before it. The trial court found that the plaintiffs derived no sub-
stantial benefit from union representation as each employee nego-
tiated his own compensation which, in turn, exceeded the union
scale wage.' The only arguable tangible benefit available to the
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. The case was remanded to the
district court for evaluation of those respective interests.
'0 Buckley v. American Fed'n of Radio & T.V. Artists, 496 F.2d 305 (2d Cir.
1974).
41 Id. at 310.
42354 F. Supp. 823, 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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plaintiffs was participation in a union pension plan, a benefit so
meager that the court could not justify characterizing the plaintiffs
as "free riders."' The appellate court found this of no significance,
holding that: "There is no rational basis for distinguishing between
the degrees of benefit one enjoys as a result of a union's bargaining
efforts on his behalf."" If there is no basis on the Buckley facts of
determining "degrees of benefit," there is no basis for determining
the existence of benefit in the first instance. It is logically impossible
to demonstrate that Buckley was favored by union representation,
because that circumstance negated the opportunity of ascertaining
what his economic rewards would have been in the absence of
union representation.
If the "benefit" determination were reached solely by the ap-
plication of common sense and the evidence before the court, the
result reached by the Second Circuit would not find general a-
ceptance. There is some indication that the court was sensitive to
this observation, as it qualified its ruling by this statement: "Of
course we do not decide whether employees who have derived no
demonstrable benefit from a union's effort are 'free riders.'"
Despite the annual proliferation of union unfair labor prac-
tices,' of massive court judgments for union-committed crimes
and civil wrongs,"7 and of egregious, ongoing union racial discrim-
ination,"8 the rote recitation of the union benefit doctrine continues.
It can not be rationally and conclusively assumed that unions in-
variably benefit those for whom they bargain in the face of such
occurrences.
If actual, not presumed, benefit is one of the criteria necessary
for the imposition of costs upon dissenters, it will of course com-
43496 F.2d at 311-12.
"Id. at 312.
45 1d. at 312, n.2.
"In fiscal year 1973, 9,022 charges were filed against unions, of which ap-
proximately one-third were found meritorious. BNA, LABOR RELATIONS Y.B.
238-41 (1974). In fiscal year 1974, charges against unions increased to 9,654; in
1975, the number increased again to 10,822. Of the latter number, 6,832 alleged
illegal restraint and coercion of employees. The percentage of meritorious charges
declined, however, to 26.4 percent. BNA, LABOR RELATIONS Y.B. (1975).
" United Aircraft Corp. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 161 Conn. 79,
285 A.2d 330 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972), further proceedings,
84 L.R.R.M. 2340 (Conn. Sup. Ct., Hartford Co. 1973), afl'd, 90 L.R.R.M.
2249 (Conn. 1975).
" EEOC v. Local 638, Sheet Metal Workers, 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976).
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plicate the process of deciding cases in which this issue is raised.
The quality of justice rendered by more incisive decisions will,
however, be enormously improved.
III. STANDING TO CHALLENGE UNION EXPENDITURES
The issue of standing is complex and requires considerable
analysis if one wishes to resolve it with regard to categories of em-
ployees as to whom no case authority exists. I have taken the space
to explore this issue fully with the hope of stimulating development
of a comprehensive and logically consistent approach.
A. Protest Must be Rendered
Agency fee payers' standing to assert claims for wrongful expen-
ditures is unquestioned. 9 One might think that the courts would
take cognizance of the involuntary nature of their affiliation, and
establish a presumption that such persons have a general objection
to all expenditures made from their extracted fees.
To date, the courts have not indulged this presumption; specific
protest against the unlawful use of compulsory fees has been re-
quired." Application of the latter rule, rather than a presumption
of general objection, does not rest on any judicial intuition that
workers forced to pay union fees really want to do so, or that they
suffer the loss silently, feeling that it is their moral and ethical bur-
den. The reason for requiring a specific protest turns simply upon
application of the class action requirements of various rules of
civil procedure.
The Georgia courts had certified the Street plaintiffs as represen-
tatives of a class of employees comprised of "all non-operating
employees of the railroad defendants affected by, and opposed to,
the hereinafter referred to union shop agreements" and who also
opposed the use of dues and fees obtained therefrom for non-collec-
tive bargaining purposes. 1 The union defendants argued with con-
siderable force that ascertainment of the composition of this class
was necessarily dependent upon a determination of the attitude
of unnamed individuals. But the factor that made this argument
41 Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
50 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. at 774; Seay I, 427
F.2d at 1004.
11 Looper v. Georgia S. & F. Ry., 215 Ga. 27, 108 S.E.2d 796, 805 (1959).
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forceful was the element of full union membership on the part of
three of the named plaintiffs, including Mr. Street." If the lower
court's class designation had been sustained, the union defendants
would have been exposed to claims by other union members for
unlimited retroactive reinbursement for political expenditures,
predicated solely upon an undisclosed statement of opposition to
such costs. It is fair to say that the Supreme Court considered that
such a result would unwarrantedly jeopardize the union's treasuries.
Accordingly, the rendition of specific notice was required.
The notice requirement is not illogical, as applied to union
members (except in the instance of an unlawful compulsory mem-
bership agreement, as discussed below). It is submitted that the
notice requirement does contradict common sense and experience
when applied to agency fee payers.
The requirement of notice rests upon an implicit assumption
that the compulsory contributor has no objection to the extraction
of his wages. The converse proposition, that objection to such
forced payments should be presumed, has some statistical support.
In a recent survey conducted by the Opinion Research Corporation
for the National Right to Work Committee, strong opposition was
expressed to compulsory unionism:
[Seventy-nine] per cent opposed the practice of using compulsory
union dues and fees to campaign for political candidates, while
only 12 per cent felt the practice to be permissible.
Compulsory unionism was opposed by a margin of 68 per cent
to 27 per cent, and 74 per cent favored retention of the section
of the Taft-Hartley Act authorizing states to approve right to work
laws, compared to 11 per cent who felt it should be repealed.
In arriving at these results, 2,173 adult men and women were
interviewed, nearly 1,000 of whom were either members of unions
or were from households of union members.
Persons interviewed were divided among manual laborers and
service employes, farm workers, clerical and sales personnel, crafts-
men and managerial people, with the largest number being 467
manual workers and service employes and the lowest number, 257,
managerial employes."
The prevailing attitude reflected in that survey is even more striking
2 Brief, supra note 31, at 99-100.
" Wheeling Intelligencer, July 24, 1974 at 14.
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when considered in conjunction with the other elements of inherent
coercion associated with the exclusive representation principle.
Those elements are discussed below, but preliminary attention is
given to the notice requirement as affected by statutory interpre-
tation.
In the Seay litigation, the plaintiffs contended that the Machin-
ists' use of agency fees for politics constituted a breach of an im-
plied condition of the collective bargaining agreement, and the
Ninth Circuit found that this adequately stated a claim for relief."
The "implied condition of contract" claim recognized by the
Ninth Circuit in Seay raises an interesting question with regard to
the necessity of specific notice as a prerequisite for perfection of a
claim by dissenters. If the limitation on political spending is read
into the contract, an expenditure of agency fees for such activities
ipso facto constitutes a breach. To the extent that the political ex-
penditures are derived from the funds of all agency fee payers
within the bargaining unit, each is affected by this breach, and
damaged thereby. Under such circumstances, presentation of a
notice of objection is superfluous; the only relevant question in that
regard is whether a portion of the dissenters' claims is barred by
the statute of limitations.
It makes little sense to conclude that spending which exceeds
and thereby breaches a contractual limitation does not give rise
to a claim for relief until the breaching party (the union) is put
on notice that dissenters intend to, or do, assert that breach in liti-
gation. Such a conclusion is even more puzzling in the absence of
recognized criteria for determining the sufficiency of a protest.
Nothing in the cases militates against the adequacy of an informal
oral protest to any union representative, even a shop steward."
Where notice is required, a simple, sensible rule can be applied
which respects human nature, comports with class action proce-
dural rules, and fairly accommodates the respective interests of
employees and unions. The rule should be that a general objection
to the use of union dues or fees for non-collective bargaining ac-
tivities is presumed on the part of agency fee payers and all persons
"Seay I, 427 F.2d at 1000-01; Seay II, 533 F.2d at 1128.
'As the statutes make no reference to such protests, it would seem uncom-
fortable for the courts to draw guidelines which would invalidate some such com-
munications on the basis of informality or the official status of the recipient.
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subject to an unlawful formal membership agreement; as to all
other employees, specific notice is essential to perfect a claim
against a union for non-collective bargaining expenditures." Ap-
plication of this rule will have the further salutary effect of dis-
couraging negotiations and enforcement of unlawful formal mem-
bership agreements.
B. Specificity of Protest
To forestall class action treatment and to multiply the difficul-
ties of prosecuting cases such as Street, unions have asserted that
dissenters must identify specific candidates or legislative measures
they oppose in order to be entitled to a proportional return of
politcial expenditures. This is a particularly unappealing argument
in light of the prevailing union practice of excluding agency fee
payers from the receipt of union publications. Not surprisingly, this
position was rejected by the Supreme Court, which stated:
It would be impracticable to require a dissenting employee to al-
lege and prove each distinct union political expenditure to which
he objects; it is enough that he manifests his opposition to any
political expenditures by the union."
General objections to other non-collective bargaining expenditures
have been held sufficient."'
C. Union Members' Standing to Avoid Contribution to Non-
Collective Bargaining Activities
The course of the following discussion involves consideration of
the legal status of various categories of employees: persons who
become union members absent a union security requirement, per-
sons who become union members pursuant to such a requirement
and persons who become union members pursuant to an unlawful
union security agreement. One common element can be traced
throughout the discussion, and it applies in greater or lesser degree
to each of the foregoing categories, depending upon a variety of
specific facts, the nature of union operating practices, and the
" No notice is required, of course, with regard to union expenditures which
are alleged to be violative of specific proscriptions established in federal or state
statutes.
"
7Allen, 373 U.S. at 118 (emphasis by the Court).
"' Ellis v. BRAC, 91 L.R.R.M. 2339 (S.D. Cal. 1976).
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statute (RLA or NLRA) governing the pertinent employment re-
lationship. The common element is the recognition that union par-
ticipation-of whatever degree selected by the employee-is in-
herently coercive in an industrial relations system premised upon
exclusive representation.
The inherent coercion to obtain union membership does not
always accompany an inescapable financial obligation. Powerful
pressures are exerted upon employees to become union members,
even absent an enforceable obligation to pay union dues or fees.
This situation is exemplified by the action of an employee who,
in a "right to work" state, chooses union membership. More fre-
quently, the considerations impelling union membership are joined
with unavoidable, explicit financial requirements-union security
provisions. In both of these situations there is a blend of powerful
tangible (financial) and intangible forces affecting each employee,
regardless of his membership status. It is this writer's conclusion
that a spending suit (i.e., a suit for non-collective bargaining ex-
penditures) may be maintained by any person paying union dues
or fees, no matter which of the foregoing membership categories
apply to him, because the fact of membership is not necessarily
reflective of a voluntary affiliation.
A combination of factors supports the conclusion that all union
members have standing to protest non-collective bargaining expen-
ditures. The pivotal factor is the union's role as exclusive bar-
gaining representative, a privilege which unions eagerly sought.0"
Aside from obligating an employer to treat with the union as
spokesman for all unit employees, this statutory privilege prohibits
employers from dealing with individual employees with regard to
their wages, hours, and working conditions."0 The next factor of
major significance is the prevailing exclusion of non-members from
all collective bargaining activities, such as contract negotiation,
administration, and grievance handling. Agency fee payers are
generally not even permitted to vote to ratify or reject the collec-
tive bargaining agreement negotiated in their behalf. 1
Union membership allows the member a part in choosing the very
course of action to which he refuses to adhere, but he has of
59Schatzki, supra note 30, at 918.0
°Medo Photo Supply v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944).
61 NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 737 (1963).
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course no role in employer conduct, and nonunion employees
have no voice in the affairs of the union."
Numerous court decisions have recognized that employees are
often coerced into union membership by an agency shop agreement
charging nonmembers the equivalent of full union dues and fees."4
The operative principle of these cases is summarized in a recent
attorney general's opinion:
[S]uch a clause in effect requires a nonunion employee to subsidize
the union's institutional activities-activities from which he re-
ceives no benefit unless he joins the union. Thus, it places him in
the position of either having to join the union in order to receive
his 'money's worth' or staying out and allowing the union to be
a 'free rider' to the extent of that subsidy. This, in turn, results
in a compulsion to join the union ....
The exclusion of agency fee payers from collective bargaining
activities unquestionably increases the pressure to obtain union
membership. Participation in collective bargaining activities has
been held of such value that its wrongful denial constitutes irre-
parable injury entitling the victim to injunctive relief."5
The pervasive disenfranchisement of agency fee payers- exerts
its maximum coercive effect in the context of airline employment,
which is governed by the Railway Labor Act. Frequently unions
negotiating agreements for airline employees reserve to the union
the sole prerogative of determining whether or not the denial of
an employee's grievance will be appealed. A grievant who feels
that he has been wrongfully foreclosed from pursuing his grievance
has only one remaining avenue of redress-litigation charging the
union with the breach of its duty of fair representation." Unless
he is able to establish employer collusion, suit will lie only against
the union." Accordingly, even if the grievant-plaintiff prevails, he
6 2NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 191 (1967).
New Jersey Turnpike Employees' Union v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority,
123 N.J. Super. 461, 303 A.2d 603 (1973), aff'd per curiam 64 N.J. 579, 319
A.2d 224 (1974); Smigel v. Southgate School Dist., 388 Mich. 531, 543, 202
N.W.2d 305, 308 (1972); cf. NLRB v. Local 138, Operating Engineers, 385
F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904 (1968).
"'Op. ATT'Y GEN. OF WASHINGTON, No. 7 at 9 (1975).
62 Bums v. Local 1503, Painters, 90 L.R.R.M. 2824 (D. Conn. 1975).
e Quimby v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
67Carroll v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 417 F.2d 1025 (Ist Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970).
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cannot obtain adequate redress unless the subject of the grievance
was a mere financial claim, as the court will have no power to
rectify the employer's action which gave rise to the grievance in
the first instance. Furthermore, the vast bulk of grievances are not
of a magnitude rendering such litigation feasible. Indeed, even
discharge from employment, which has been called "industrial
capital punishment," often goes uncontested because of the unavail-
ability of litigation resources."'
Although discriminatory and abusive treatment such as that
described may be remedied in some instances by National Labor
Relations Board, which investigates and prosecutes unfair labor
practices, this relief is not available to railway and airline em-
ployees. No union unfair labor practices are specified in the Rail-
way Labor Act. A railway union choosing to afflict bargaining
unit employees with invidious, treatment rests secure in the know-
ledge that the employee will have to surmount a staggering accu-
mulation of obstacles in order to obtain redress (and bearing in
mind, of course, that if the injury was non-financial in character,
adequate redress may be impossible because of the employer's
insulation from judicial relief).
Thus the employees must find an attorney who is either ade-
quately trained in labor relations law or is willing to devote the time
necessary to secure an adequate background for the circumstances
of that case. The employee must also somehow conduct an investi-
gation which will reflect a sufficient likelihood of success to justify
the expenditure or commitment of the necessary resources for the
inception of litigation. Finally, the time and financial resources
necessary to conduct extensive discovery and prosecute the case,
often through appeals, must be found.
It requires no imagination to perceive the invitation for the
arbitrary exercise of power inherent in these circumstances. This
perception is certainly not hidden from employees, who readily
grasp that the fealty of union membership, with its attendant finan-
cial obligations, is "an offer [they] can't refuse.""
Judicial awareness of the pressures impelling employees to seek
union membership can be seen in Street. During the progress of
68 Tobias, A Plea for the Wrongfully Discharged Employee Abandoned by His
Union, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 55 (1972).
OM. Puzo, THE GODFATHER 39 (1969).
1976]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
that litigation, three of the plaintiffs became full members of the
Brotherhood of Railway Clerks (now BRAC). The union defen-
dants argued that these plaintiffs had chosen membership, thereby
waiving any claim for dues and fees paid pursuant to the union
shop agreement.'"
This argument fell upon deaf ears, and each of those "voluntary"
union members later participated fully in the stipulated relief ac-
corded nonmembers-the return of all dues and fees, and a release
of any obligation to pay future amounts to the union as a condition
of employment."' While the stipulated result may have embodied
a compromise of the unions' position in order to terminate bur-
densome litigation, it is critically significant that none of the appel-
late courts drew any distinction between the rights of dissenting
union members and dissenting nonmembers.
Ironically, the basis for rejection of the unions' waiver argument
was set forth in their own brief. In emphatic terms, they equated
the quantum of coercion found in forced support of political activi-
ties with that involved in forced admission to the dictates of an
exclusive representative in collective bargaining:
Compelling financial support of a union involves just as much
if not more infringement on freedom in the sphere of supporting
different policies in negotiating agreements and processing griev-
ances as occurs in the legislative or political sphere; in the nego-
tiating field the impact of the union's activities on the individual
is direct and binding .... The compulsions which the court below
accepts as constitutional when applied to the realm of negotiating
contracts and processing grievances are not constitutionally less
objectionable than the activities the court below finds uncon-
stitutional.
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the pressures to obtain
union membership posed by (1) the broad-reaching power of the
exclusive representative, and (2) the exclusion of non-members
from their own bargaining affairs is often irresistible.'3 These pres-
sures are immensely powerful, and inherently coercive. The source
of the former was union legislative influence, and the latter flows
'"Brief, supra note 31, at 99-100.
1 Stipulation dated Dec. 29, 1964 at 2, sub nom. Looper v. Georgia S. & F.
Ry., No. 16, 537 (Ga. Super. Ct.), adopted in final order and judgment that date.
72 Brief, supra note 31, at 49.
" Schatzki, supra note 30, at 914.
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from union operational practices. Balanced against the coercion
that each exerts, the presuasiveness of an argument that those who
select union membership voluntarily endow their union with carte
blanche authority to spend their money diminishes greatly. That
argument is even less persuasive where a union security agreement
exists, and the employee must still pay equivalent dues and fees,
if he eschews union membership. The argument is untenable in the
presence of an unlawful union security agreement compelling actual
union membership.
Implementation of the foregoing analysis by permitting every
union member to assert a spending protest will not result in unions
being unfairly penalized if they forego the temptation to expend
involuntary dues and fees upon activities beyond the purview of
collective bargaining. The Supreme Court has ruled that dissenters
must put the union on notice of their protest in order to perfect
their claim." A union that maintains adequate accounting records
and observes, adequate practices ought therefore to be in a position
to respond promptly to an employee's protest. Unions could, of
course, greatly minimize their exposure to any such claims by in-
suring that the financial support of their non-collective bargaining
activities is derived from contributions having a far greater in-
dicium of voluntariness than that which may be asserted with
regard to present membership dues.
How may this higher indicium be established? If unions were
to refrain from charging nonmembers for non-collective bargaining
activities, and abandon their exclusion of nonmembers from col-
lective bargaining activities, the assertion that those who obtained
membership did so voluntarily would have immensely greater credi-
bility than does any such assertion premised upon existing prac-
tices. Unions that remain unbending in the exercise of their power
over dissenters, have little reason to complain of resulting "vexa-
tious" litigation; the prerogative of forestalling such litigation rests
almost entirely with the unions themselves.
IV. LEGAL BASES OF DISSENTERS' CLAIMS
The discussion which follows with regard to constitutional claims,
contractual claims, and those arising under the duty of fair rep-
74Although that claim may be first asserted in the complaint, it will not be
given retroactive effect. Street, 367 U.S. at 774.
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resentation applies with equal force to spending protests under
the NLRA and the RLA, as the obligations owed by unions op-
erating under those two statutes are coextensive on these points.
The definitive spending cases have applied and interpreted the
Railway Labor Act, and emphasis is placed upon the legislative
history of that enactment. As the authorization for union security
provisions contained in the RLA followed passage of the Taft-
Hartley Acte' by four years, and was patterned upon the earlier
legislation, there is no basis for varying a union's duty to dissenters
depending upon the particular statute under which their employ-
ment is performed.
A. Constitutional Cause of Action
Preliminarily, it should be pointed out that no relief has as yet
been granted any dissenters for a proven violation of constitutional
rights. Nevertheless, plaintiffs continue to assail union use of com-
pulsory dues for non-collective bargaining purposes, contending
that such expenditures abridge constitutional freedoms." A Michi-
gan appellate court has held that an agency shop clause applied
to nonmember teachers "could violate plaintiffs' First and Four-
teenth Amendment rights," but withheld relief on other grounds."
Although the decisions rendered thus far have delineated the
scope of prohibited spending based upon statutory interpretation,
it is important to consider the format of the constitutional argu-
ments which have been advanced, as the statutory interpretation
has been greatly influenced by the court's desire to avoid deter-
mination of those controversies on constitutional grounds. In de-
cisions rendered thus far, the strictures of the First and Fifth
Amendments have been emphasized by dissenters' counsel."'
- 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
76See Ellis v. BRAC, 91 L.R.R.M. 2339 (S.D. Cal. 1976); Seay v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1970), further proceedings, 371
F. Supp. 754 (C.D. Cal. 1973), rev'd, 533 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1976); Robbins-
dale Educ. Ass'n v. Robbinsdale Fed'n of Teachers, Local 872, 239 N.W.2d 437
(Minn.), vacated sub nom. Threlkeld v. Robbinsdale Fed'n of Teachers, Local
872, 97 S. Ct. 225 (1976); Knight v. Alsop, 535 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1976).
"Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 60 Mich. App. 92, 230 N.W.2d 322 (1975),
currently on appeal to the United States Supreme Court, No. 75-1153.
71See Railway Employes' Dep't, AFL v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956); Seay
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1970); Brotherhood of
Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963); Reid v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
443 F.2d 408 (10th Cir. 1971).
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1. The Presence of State Action
Unions have attempted to forestall constitutional scrutiny of
their expenditures by urging that the indispensable element of state
action is absent. The courts have not been receptive to this argu-
ment."'
2. Claims of First Amendment Violation
Aside from the cases in which union financial support has been
opposed on the grounds of interference with religious belief," dis-
senters' claims of First Amendment infringement have focused
upon forced membership in, and financial support of, unions as
denials of free association and free speech. As noted, actual union
membership has been proscribed as a mandatory condition of
employment under the NLRA and the RLA on the basis of statu-
tory interpretation.'1 In a recent en banc decision largely premised
upon the earlier challenges to the RLA, the Washington Supreme
Court squarely held that forced membership in an organization is
an unlawful derogation of First Amendment associational rights."
Compulsory financial support is treated similarly, though with less
emphasis. In Good, the plaintiffs- challenged requirements that they
become members of and contribute to a students' organization
which "has consistently promoted a one-sided political viewpoint,
both in its choice of speakers and in taking public positions on
various controversial topics."'" The issues confronting the court
were tersely described and forcefully resolved:
However, there remains plaintiff's assertion that their First Amend-
ment rights have been violated by the requirement of mandatory
membership in the ASUW and financial support thereof. The main
thrust of plaintiffs' position is that they have a constitutionally
protected right to not associate with any group, just as they enjoy
" Railway Employes' Dep't, AFL v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956);
Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14, 16-17 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 872 (1971); Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996 (9th Cir.
1970).
"0Gray v. Gulf M. & O.R.R., 429 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1001 (1971).
8! See cases cited supra notes 19 & 26.
"Good v. Associated Students of the Univ. of Wash., 86 Wash. 2d 94, 542
P.2d 762 (1975).
83 Id. at 96, 542 P.2d at 764.
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a concomitant right to associate with any group of their choice.
We agree.
Freedom to associate carries with it a corresponding right to
not associate."
The Washington court then embarked upon a review of Hanson,
Street, and Lathrop,'" the Supreme Court decisions which have
most closely approached the question of associational infringement
flowing from compulsory financial support of an organization.
Hanson is often cited by union attorneys as authority for the
blanket proposition that union security provisions are compatible
with the First Amendment. This argument runs counter to the ex-
press language in Hanson, and to its own author's subsequent
interpretation. Mr. Justice Douglas, who wrote Hanson, later stated
in his concurring opinion in Street that Hanson was confined to
approval of the requirement that all who were benefited by collec-
tive bargaining activities could be compelled to contribute to the
cost of those activities.86 Both Douglas and Black (dissenting) be-
lieved that the First Amendment issues raised in Street were ap-
propriate for decision, and they both set forth an unequivocal con-
demnation of the practice of using dissenters' dues and fees for
political purposes." The error of asserting Hanson as broad con-
stitutional authority for all aspects of compulsory unionism is
pointed out in Good: "The [Hanson] court expressly reserved the
issue of First Amendment violations as not being presented by the
record.""
The very recent Knight"' decision makes it plain that there is
room for disagreement as to the reach of constitutional questions
decided in Hanson. The Eighth Circuit viewed Hanson as holding
that the RLA authorization of union shop agreements, on its face,
neither worked a denial of due process nor infringed upon dissent-
ers' rights of free speech and association. For purposes of analyzing
84Id. at 100, 542 P.2d at 766.
Supra notes 1 & 29; Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
88 367 U.S. at 776.
87 Id. at 775-97.
1186 Wash. 2d at 102, 542 P.2d at 767.
89 Knight v. Alsop, 535 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1976).
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dissenters' rights litigable in a spending case, however, the Eighth
Circuit's interpretation of Hanson is keyed to the conclusion that
constitutional immunity exists only with regard to the payment of
dues, fees and assessments utilized to defray the costs of collective
bargaining. 0
Lathrop, decided the same day as Street, upheld a state require-
ment of compulsory membership in an integrated bar, notwith-
standing the existence of some unspecified legislative activities en-
gaged in by the bar association. Although a majority of the
Lathrop Court agreed that the First Amendment issues were
present, no agreement could be reached on their resolution. As
might be anticipated, nothing of clarity in constitutional doctrine
emerged from that "curiously reasoned, rambling opinion."" In
dissent, Mr. Justice Black vigorously castigated the plurality opin-
ion: "I do not believe that either the bench, the bar or the litigants
will know what has been decided in this case-certainly I do not."'
Avoiding the "convolutions" of the foregoing Supreme Court
decisions, the Washington court forthrightly addressed the Good
plaintiffs' constitutional claims:
[W]e have no hesitancy in holding that the state, through the
university, may not compel membership in an association, such
as the ASUW, which purports to represent all the students at the
university, including these plaintiffs. That association expends
funds for political and economic causes to which the dissenters
object and promotes and espouses political, social and economic
philosophies which the dissenters find repugnant to their own views.
There is no room in the First Amendment for such absolute com-
pulsory support, advocation and representation."
The case was then remanded to the trial court for a determination
of appropriate relief, which in turn will require evaluation of the
various ASUW activities to see if they meet the standard of suffici-
ently presenting varying viewpoints to constitute a truly educational
function.
The major principle to be derived from Good, for present pur-
poses, is that compulsory financial participation in an organization
"I Id. at 470.
91 Good v. Associated Students of the Univ. of Wash., 86 Wash. 2d 94, 542
P.2d 762 (1975).
"Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
"86 Wash. 2d at 104, 542 P.2d at 768.
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which promotes "one particular viewpoint, political, social, eco-
nomic or religious,""4 is contrary to the command of the First
Amendment. The expression of this rule as a matter of constitu-
tional adjudication, not statutory interpretation, lends strong sup-
port to dissenters' claims that union expenditures must be rigorously
scrutinized and purged of funding from coerced sources. The Su-
preme Court has recently confirmed that financial contributions for
political purposes have constitutional significance:
The [Federal Election Campaign] Act's contribution and expendi-
ture limitations also impinge on protected associational freedoms.
Making a contribution, like joining a political party, serves to
affiliate a person with a candidate.
[M]oney is a neutral element not always associated with speech
but a necessary and integral part of many, perhaps most, forms
of communication.' 5
Although the decisions in the spending cases have sought to
avoid making constitutional determinations, the effort has not been
wholly successful. In its first Seay decision, the Ninth Circuit ob-
served that:
The diversion of the employees' money from use for the purposes
for which it was exacted damages them doubly. Its utilization to
support candidates and causes the plaintiffs oppose renders them
captive to the ideas, associations and causes espoused by others.
At the same time it depletes their own funds and resources to the
extent of the expropriation and renders them unable by these
amounts to express their own convictions and their own ideas and
to support their own causes."
If the use of dissenters' funds for union political activities is at most
a statutory violation, it is difficult to ascribe any import to the
court's statement. The connotation of irreparable, or even accentu-
ated, harm implicit within it lacks any force unless it is grounded
upon the First Amendment's assurances of political freedom. Ab-
sent that foundation, there is no reason to draw a distinction be-
tween a union political contribution and a set of golf clubs for a
retiring union officer, insofar as injury to dissenters is concerned.
9Id.
Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612, 636, 657 n.76 (1976).
427 F.2d at 1004.
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3. Claims of Fifth Amendment Violations
As in the case of the First Amendment claims, consideration of
the Fifth Amendment claims described below has undoubtedly led
to the statutory interpretation confining the permissible use of dis-
senters' dues and fees to activities within the scope of collective
bargaining.
If the Railway Labor Act were interpreted to grant an ex-
clusive bargaining representative unfettered discretion to spend
compulsory dues and fees for non-collective bargaining purposes,
a claim would be sustainable for deprivation of property without
due process of law, in volation of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Assessment of this point will be of
greatest assistance in passing upon union expenditures other than
those of a political nature, as the latter were clearly disposed of in
Street and Allen.
Section 2, Eleventh is an exercise of the power of Congress un-
der the Commerce Clause," and acts of Congress under that power
are subject to the due process limitations of the Fifth Amend-
ment." To the extent that employees are forced to pay money to
a union, they are, of course, deprived of property.
Congress has delegated to unions the quasi-governmental power
to extract funds from the employees they represent and to spend
those funds for collective bargaining and grievance handling. How-
ever, "Congress cannot delegate any part of its legislative power
except under the limitation of a prescribed standard"" which, at a
minimum, "sufficiently marks the field within which the Admin-
istrator is to act so that it may be known whether he has kept
within it in compliance with the legislative will.""'
Here, however, if Congress intended that unions have discretion
to spend compulsory dues and fees on anything other than collec-
tive bargaining and grievance handling, it provided neither stand-
"Railway Employes' Dep't, AFL v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956).
"Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Ref. Co., 338 U.S. 604, 616
(1950); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 14 (1939); Virginia Ry. v. System Fed'n
No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 558 (1937); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295
U.S. 330, 347 (1935).
"United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 282 U.S. 311, 324 (1931);
see A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Pana-
ma Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
"'Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944).
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ards nor even broad guidelines to mark the field within which such
spending is permissible. In the absence of limiting standards, the
power conferred upon unions would therefore be the power to
appropriate and spend the property of an unwilling minority for
literally anything under the sun other than political activities.
This is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is
not even delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively
disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be and
often are adverse to the interests of [the minority] .... [A] statute
which attempts to confer such power undertakes an intolerable and
unconstitutional interference with personal liberty and private
property. The delegation is ... clearly arbitrary, and... clearly a
denial of rights safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. ..
Indeed, such "unbridled discretion" would violate the Fifth Amend-
ment even if delegated to a government official."'
The necessity of restrictive statutory interpretation is further evi-
denced by the fact that labor organizations certified as exclusive
collective bargaining representatives under the RLA and NLRA
are not confined to activities pertinent to that role. They are free
to engage in a limitless range of lawful activities surpassing the
boundaries of labor relations.1"
B. Dissenters' Statutory Claims for Relief
To a large extent, the foregoing materials outline the nature of
the statutory claims which have been raised. Further detail is
offered to assist in evaluating the Ellis"' decision, and to facilitate
application of the emerging statutory standards to new litigation
contexts.
In Street, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the
purpose of Congress in enacting section 2, Eleventh was "the elim-
ination of the 'free riders'--those employees who obtained the
benefits of the unions' participation in the machinery of the Act
without financially supporting the unions..... The Court conse-
"''Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936).
102United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958).
1-45 U.S.C. § 151, Sixth (1926); 29 U.S.C. S 152(5) (1970).
0491 L.R.R.M. 2339 (S.D. Cal. 1976).
1" 367 U.S. at 761.
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quently construed the statute as not allowing the unions unfettered
discretion in the expenditure of coerced dues and fees. It held that
political spending by unions of monies coerced from dissenting
employees is a statutory violation because such spending "is not
a use which helps defray the expenses of the negotiation or ad-
ministration of collective agreements, or the expenses entailed
in the adjustment of grievances and disputes."'"
In Hanson, the Supreme Court upheld section 2, Eleventh's
"requirement for financial support of the collective-bargaining
agency by all who receive the benefits of its work"'' 7 on the ground
that "[t]he financial support required relates ... to the work of
the union in the realm of collective bargaining." The Court noted
that "[I]f 'assessments. are in fact imposed for purposes not ger-
mane to collective bargaining, a different problem would be pre-
sented."' 8 In Street, although the Court read the RLA as not al-
lowing unions to expend coerced dues and fees on politics, it
explicitly reserved judgment on other non-collective bargaining
expenditures to which employees may object because that matter
was not before them.'" The Ellis case" raised the question reserved
in Street: whether section 2, Eleventh denies unions the power to
spend coerced dues and fees upon any and all activities other than
collective bargaining and grievance handling.
Examining the legislative history of section 2, Eleventh, the
Supreme Court first noted that in adopting that provision Congress
modified its "firm legislative policy against compulsion ... only as
a specific response to the recognition of the expenses and burdens
incurred by the unions in the administration of the complex scheme
of the Railway Labor Act.'" The role of the unions under this
statutory scheme was next described by the Court as "collective
bargaining as the method of settling railway disputes,.... the status
of exclusive representatives in the negotiation and administration
of collective agreements,.... representation on the statutory board
'" Id. at 768. Accord, Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996,
1003-04 (9th Cir. 1970).
107351 U.S. at 238.
108 Id. at 235.
109 367 U.S. at 768-70.
11091 L.R.R.M. 2339 (S.D. Cal. 1976).
"' International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 751 (1961).
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to adjudicate grievances, ... [and] the duty fairly and equitably
to represent all employees of the craft or class, union and non-
union.'"" It was the costs of these functions, and these functions
only, that Congress contemplated employees would be compelled to
support by compulsory unionism arrangements:
The principal argument made by the unions in 1950 [urging adop-
tion of § 2, Eleventh] was based on their role in this regulatory
framework. They maintained that because of the expense of per-
forming their duties in the congressional scheme, fairness justified
the spreading of the costs to all employees who benefitted. They
thus advanced as their purpose the elimination of the 'free riders'
This argument was decisive with Congress.'
The Supreme Court concluded its review of the legislative history
of section 2, Eleventh by stating:
[I]t is abundantly clear that Congress did not completely abandon
the policy of full freedom of choice embodied in the 1934 Act,
but rather made inroads on it for the limited purpose of eliminat-
ing the problems created by the 'free rider.' . . . We respect this
congressional purpose when we construe § 2, Eleventh as not vest-
ing the unions with unlimited power to spend exacted money."4
The conclusion from the logic of the majority opinion in Street
is that section 2, Eleventh restricts the power of unions to spend
exacted money, over objection, to support any non-collective bar-
gaining activity. Mr. Justice Whittaker, in his separate opinion in
Street, understood the majority holding in which he concurred as:
[T]hat, in enacting § 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act, Con-
gress intended to, and impliedly did, limit the use that railway
labor unions may make of dues, fees and assessments, collected
from those of its members who were or are required to become or
remain its members by force of union shop contracts negotiated as
permitted by that section, only to defray the costs of negotiating
and administering collective bargaining agreements-including the
adjustment and settlment of disputes .... 15
This interpretation was accepted by the Georgia Supreme Court
u' Id. at 760-61.
"'Id. at 761-62.
114 Id. at 767-68.
,'Id. at 779 (emphasis added).
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on remand,"' and in a later case by the Fifth Circuit: "[The
expenditure of union funds for non-collective bargaining purposes
was interdicted by the Court's statutory construction in Street."""
The Ninth Circuit agrees:
The Supreme Court has said as clearly as possible that agency
fees exacted from employees under the terms of the bargaining
agreement must be limited to use in sharing the costs with other
dues of 'negotiating and administering collective agreements, and
the costs of the adjudgment [sic] and settlement of disputes.' This
limitation is read into the statute under the terms of which the
collective bargaining agreement, with its agency fee provision, was
entered into in this case."'
This limiting construction was held equally applicable to expen-
ditures of unions functioning under the aegis of the National Labor
Relations Act."'
C. Non-Collective Bargaining Expenditures As A Breach of the
Duty of Fair Representation and A Breach of Contract
Subsequent to Allen, 2" dissenters broadened their claims of unlaw-
fulness with regard to union expenditures, and asserted that expen-
ditures for non-collective bargaining purposes created claims for
relief based upon a breach of the union's duty of fair representa-
tion. Assertion of that theory has been approved by the courts,'
and in one instance, judgment was rendered on that ground alone.'
The Ninth Circuit has held that there is an implied-in-law limi-
tation in an agency shop agreement that fees generated therefrom
will be limited to sharing collective bargaining costs. Accordingly,
'" International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 217 Ga. 351, 122 S.E.2d 220,
222 (1961).
"'Gray v. Gulf M. & O.R.R., 429 F.2d 1064, 1071 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971); see Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 316 F. Supp.
1369, 1371 (D. Mass. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 14 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 872 (1971), "The only purpose of the requirement is to supply funds to
the union to compensate it for the performance of its functions as a federally-
empowered agent, as contemplated by the NLR Act."
I"' Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 1970).
119 See cases cited at note 8 supra.
120Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
... Reid v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 443 F.2d 408 (10th Cir. 1971), later
proceedings sub noma. Reid v. United Auto Workers, 80 L.R.R.M. 2886 (N.D.
Okla. 1972), aff'd, 479 F.2d 517 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076 (1973).
"' Ellis v. BRAC, 91 L.R.R.M. 2339, 2343 (S.D. Cal. 1976).
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expenditures of forced dues for other purposes establish a con-
tractual claim for relief.' 2
V. A CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION OF "COLLECTIVE BARGAINING"
The lawfulness of union expenditures will in each case be largely
predicated upon the characterization of activities as "collective
bargaining" or "non-collective bargaining," so it is well to arrive
at a conceptual definition of that term. As the only instance of
judicial application of "collective bargaining" criteria to a broad
range of customary union activities (the Ellis case) omits detailed
recitation of its definitional standards, I shall discuss that case in
a later section.'"
The process of collective bargaining was congressionally author-
ized in the Railway Labor Act,"n the National Industrial Recovery
Act,"' and its successor, the National Labor Relations Act."
The Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations
Act included a definition of collective bargaining:
[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obli-
gation of the employer and the representative of the employees to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising there-
under, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any
agreement reached if requested by either party....
The statutory definition reflects long-standing common usage,"
and it accords with descriptions of academicians and practitioners
12 Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 1970),
further proceedings, 371 F. Supp. 754 (C.D. Cal. 1973), rev'd, 533 F.2d 1126,
1128 (9th Cir. 1976).
124 See discussion at notes 147 through 161 infra.
12545 U.S.C. § 152, First and Second (1970).
12 Pub. L. No. 67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). NIRA was subsequently declared
unconstitutional in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935).12729 U.S.C. §§ 151, 159(a) (1970).
12829 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
1" Statement of Samuel Gompers, AMERICAN FEDERATIONIST, (March 1920).
Taylor, The Function of Collective Bargaining, MANAGEMENT'S STAKE IN COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING 3 (American Management Association Personnel Series No.
81, 1944).
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in the field of labor relations.1" Some commentators have noted
the interrelationship between traditional collective bargaining and
union legislative efforts, which "in a sense may be considered as an
alternative to the collective bargaining process.''. Of course, union
expenditures incurred in conjunction with such legislation do not
thereby lose their "political"'82 character.
The relatively precise sphere of union activities falling within
the concept of collective bargaining has been reflected in judicial
decisions. An inclusive definition was stated by the Fourth Cir-
cuit: "Collective bargaining, however, has the well-understood
meaning in the law of settling disputes by negotiation between
employer and the representative of the employees.'
'1
This emphasis upon the discussing of working conditions be-
tween the representatives of a particular group of employees and
their employer is of considerable significance. Unions often repre-
sent diverse groups of employee vocational skills, in diverse indus-
tries and far-flung geographic areas.
Several courts have ventured into this definitional area with an
exclusive approach-rendering decisions which categorize certain
union functions and activities as being beyond the purview of col-
lective bargaining. Most notable, of course, are Street and Allen
which proscribe imposing the cost of political endeavors upon
dissenters. '
In one instance, the Supreme Court reviewed a union's brief,
130 J. VAN SICKLE, INDUSTRY-WIDE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 6 (1947). H. DAVEY, CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 6
(1951). Id. at 9. C. RANDLE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PRINCIPLES AND PRAC-
TICES 86-87 (1951). Chamberlain, supra n.122 at 121, 125, 130. M. TROrA,
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING Vii (1961). M. RYDER, C. REHMUS & S. COHEN, MAN-
AGEMENT PREPARATION FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 141 (1966). A. SLOAN &
F. WHITNEY, LABOR RELATIONS 181 (2d ed. 1972). J. KAUFMAN, COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY 137 (1973).
181 R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD & D. ROTHSCHILD, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND
LABOR ARBITRATION 3, 8 (1970), F. HARBISON & J. COLEMAN, GOALS AND STRA-
TEGY IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 16 (1951).
181 See the dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J., strenuously arguing that rail-
road union legislative activities are inseparable from the conduct of collective
bargaining in that industry. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S.
740, 811-16 (1961).
13' United Const. Workers v. Haislip Baking CO., 223 F.2d 872, 877 (4th Cir.
1955), citing Virginian Ry. v. Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937). NLRB v. Boss
Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 187, 189 (7th Cir. 1941).
'
14 Supra note 1.
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which described in some detail its varied interests. The brief stated
that:
Rather typically, unions use their members' dues to promote legis-
lation which they regard as desirable and to defeat legislation which
they regard as undesirable, to publish newspapers and magazines,
to promote free labor institutions in other nations, to finance low
cost housing, to aid victims of natural disaster, to support charities,
to finance litigation, to provide scholarships, and to do those things
which the members authorize the union to do in their interest and
on their behalf."
The Court responded:
We cannot take seriously petitioners' unsupported suggestion at
the oral argument that we must assume that the union spends all
of its income on collective bargaining expenses. The record is
entirely silent on this matter one way or the other and it would be
unique indeed if the union expended no funds for noncollective
bargaining purposes.
As indicated in the text, petitioners' brief seems to concede as
much and petitioners later appeared to modify or withdraw the
suggestion at the oral argument."'
The discussion in Schermerhorn is interesting from the standpoint
of establishing a demarcation between collective bargaining costs
imposable by statute and those which the Court referred to as
"institutional expenses." The Court commented upon the unfairness
to those dissidents who are compelled to pay the full rate contrib-
uted by voluntary union members and then proceeded to sever the
statutorily approved collective bargaining costs from the general
overhead incurred in operating a union:
If the union's total budget is divided between collective bargaining
and institutional expenses and if nonmember payments, equal to
those of a member, go entirely for collective bargaining costs, the
nonmember will pay more of these expenses than his pro rata share.
The member will pay less and to that extent a portion of his fees
and dues is available to pay institutional expenses. The union's
budget is balanced. By paying a large share of collective bargaining
costs the nonmember subsidizes the union's institutional activi-
ties." '
135 Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963).
158 Id.
137 Id. at 754.
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In its discussion of appropriate relief, the Court in Street pointed
out that any remedy granted should safeguard dissenters from the
subsidization of union political activities, and from payment of a
disproportionate share of collective bargaining costs."'
Only two administrative decisions touching upon the area of
noncollective bargaining activities imposable upon dissenters have
been rendered. The decisions are in conflict, and the later of the
two, which purports to distinguish the first decision rather than
overrule it, is of singularly poor quality.
The first case, Teamsters Local 959, ' involved a charge of un-
fair labor practices growing out of the union's imposition of a
"working assessment" upon nonmembers. The assessment was
made to finance a credit union and a building fund. The Board
held that such amounts are not "periodic dues" and could not
lawfully be required of nonmembers. The Board briefly reviewed
the legislative history dealing with the "free rider" argument and
went on to hold that:
[I]t is manifest that dues that do not contribute, and that are not
intended to contribute, to the cost of operation of a union in its
capacity as a collective-bargaining agent cannot be justified as
necessary for the elimination of "free riders."
Here neither the "dues" for the credit union nor those for the
building fund were for the purpose of supporting the Respondent
as a collective-bargaining agent, and they therefore do not fall
within the proviso to Section 8(a) (3) of the Act.' *
The second decision was rendered in Detroit Mailers Union No.
40.2" The majority opinion found that no unfair labor practices pro-
scribed by the National Labor Relations Act were wrought by the
respondent union's use of compulsory fees for a mortuary fund,
a pension fund, and a retirement home fund. This opinion was
predicated upon the statutory history and the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Schermerhorn."' Although reliance was purportedly placed
upon the statutory history, none was cited by the majority.
The second, and similarly erroneous premise of the majority
181367 U.S. at 774-75.
139 167 N.L.R.B. 1042 (1967).
140 Id. 1045.
141192 N.L.R.B. 951 (1971).
142373 U.S. 746.
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opinion is its misreading of the Schermerhorn decision. Scher-
merhorn simply ruled that an agreement imposing collective bar-
gaining costs upon all employees in a bargaining unit is a form
of union security subject to state regulation pursuant to section
14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act.'' In the course of that decision,
the Court pointed out that union dues "may be used for a 'variety
of purposes, in addition to meeting the union's costs of collective
bargaining.' "" This statement plainly did not place the imprima-
tur of approval upon this common practice; it simply pointed out
that as a matter of fact, union dues are often expended upon non-
collective bargaining activities. The propriety of such expenditures
was not at issue in that case.
Aside from the questionable vitality of the Detroit Mailers de-
cision in NLRB proceedings, it is not authoritative in any spending
case raising substantial issues of constitutional and statutory vio-
lations. The Board majority explicitly recognized that the payment
of dues cannot be compelled for purposes "inimical to public pol-
icy," and then stated that: "[N]obody contends here that the dues
were other than periodic and uniformly required, or that their
designated or actual use was inimical to public policy."1"4 In contra-
distinction, assertions that constitutional and statutory rights are
violated by diversion of dissenters' compulsory dues and fees to
noncollective bargaining activities raise public policy questions of
the most sensitive nature.""
In summary, a reasonably precise conceptual definition of "col-
lective bargaining" has emerged premised upon the contributions
of labor writers, academicians, congressional statements, and ju-
dicial decisions. Each of these sources focuses the rubric of "collec-
tive bargaining" upon indispensable parties, a specific process, and
a specific subject area. The parties are employers and representa-
tives of employees, i.e., unions. The process is negotiation between
those parties. The subject is that of employment conditions. If
union expenditures are made for activities other than the repre-
sentation of employees vis a vis their employer, or for purposes
or functions having no roots in the collective bargaining agreement,
1'29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970).
144 373 U.S. at 753-54.
1 192 N.L.R.B. at 952.
14 Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996, 1004 (9th Cir. 1970).
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the application of definitional standards renders those expenditures
unimposable upon dissenters.
VI. THE ELLIS CASE-A DEFINITIVE SURVEY OF
NON-COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COSTS
The Ellis case had been in litigation for nearly three years when
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs was rendered on the
issue of liability. The plaintiffs and class memberse " were employees
of Western Airlines, represented under the RLA by the Brother-
hood of Railway and Airline Clerks (BRAC) 's Through dis-
covery, a massive record was accumulated, providing considerable
detail as to the nature of many activities undertaken by BRAC,
and in some instances, disclosing a portion of the associated costs.
In its order granting summary judgment,"' the court specifically
listed a number of union activities whose costs were found to be
nonchargeable against dissenters. Calculation of damages was de-
ferred pending trial.
Two general observations should be borne in mind as one re-
views the court's decision. First, the ruling that dissenters may not
be compelled to financially support the listed activities in no way
impairs unions from engaging in those activities. The sole limiting
effect is that fiscal support for the listed union functions must be
derived from amounts contributed by voluntary union members.
Secondly, certain activities mentioned in the Ellis judgment may
in some small measure relate to the conduct of collective bar-
gaining on behalf of the plaintiffs; however, the bulk of costs asso-
ciated with those activities reflects extensive involvement with other
proscribed categories. For example, much of the convention pro-
ceedings and a large proportion of publication space concentrate
upon union political activities or goals. Whether or not the overall
costs can be accurately allocated between the chargeable and non-
chargeable functions remains for determination in the damages
phase of the trial.
'Ellis includes two consolidated cases; the Ellis plaintiffs are agency fee
payers, whereas the companion Fails plaintiffs and class members are union
members.
"' This union was the principal defendant in Street and in Allen.
149 1 L.R.R.M. 2339.
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Those activities which the Ellis court held to be non-collective
bargaining in nature are:
(1) Recreational, social and entertainment expenses for activities
not attended by management personnel of Western Airlines.
(2) Operation of a death benefit program.
(3) Organizing and recruiting new members for BRAC among
Western Airlines bargaining unit employees.
(4) Organizing and recruiting new members for BRAC, and/or
seeking collective bargaining authority or recognition for:
(a) employees not employed by Western Airlines;
(b) employees not employed in the air transportation industry;
(c) employees not employed in other transportation industries.
(5) Publications in which substantial coverage is devoted to gen-
eral news, recreational, and social activities, political and legisla-
tive matters, and cartoons.
(6) Contributions to charities and individuals.
(7) Programs to provide insurance, and medical and legal services
to the BRAC membership, or portions thereof, other than such
program secured for its salaried officers and employees.
(8) Conducting and attending conventions of BRAC.
(9) Conducting and attending conventions of other organizations
and/or labor unions.
(10) Defense or prosecution of litigation not having as its subject
matter the negotiation or administration of collective bargaining
agreements or settlement or adjustment of grievances or disputes
of employees represented by BRAC.
(11 ) Support for or opposition to proposed, pending, or existing
legislative measures.
(12) Support for or opposition to proposed, pending, or existing
governmental executive orders, policies, or decisions."'
One should not infer that expenditures for activities other than
those listed above were deemed imposable upon the plaintiffs. The
court adopted the language quoted from the proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law submitted by plaintiffs' counsel with
very few changes. This point can readily be illustrated by refer-
ence to the first item: "[R]ecreational, social and entertainment
expenses for activities not attended by management personnel of
Western Airlines." That particular language was chosen for the
very pragmatic reason that BRAC's International Secretary-Treas-
urer had admitted that not all social and recreational expenses
15091 L.R.R.M. at 2342.
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were considered part of collective bargaining, and he then offered
the explanation that social functions not attended by management
personnel fell into the non-collective bargaining area. 1 The evi-
dence indicated that the great bulk of the defendants' social and rec-
reational expenses were related to this admittedly non-collective
bargaining area, and it appeared unlikely that a reasonably accurate
allocation could be made. Therefore, the proposed categorization
of excludable activities was stated so as to maximize the advantage
of this admission. Perhaps the court would have insulated the plain-
tiffs from payment for all social and recreational activities, but
it was thought to be unnecessary to seek a determination of the
broader category.
Union spokesmen urge that every union activity is inextricably
interwoven with the collective bargaining function; that even such
things as social functions increase the union's power at the bar-
gaining table because they generate improved morale among union
members. This argument is substantially undercut by the legislative
history, "' and of course it cannot, even if accepted as factual, con-
trol the resolution of constitutionally sensitive issues.
At the time they were seeking congressional authorization for
section 2, Eleventh, union spokesmen took pains to refute any
inference that the purpose of their request was that of obtaining
compulsory financing for programs that would augment union
power in general. George M. Harrison, chief spokesman for the
Railway Labor Executives Association,1" addressed Congress and
."expressly disclaimed that the union shop was sought in order to
strengthen the bargaining power of the unions. ' "
Examination of the legislative history and consideration of spe-
cific union activities, insofar as their financing is affected by the
application of constitutional standards, leads to the formulation
Deposition of Daniel J. Sullivan, Dec. 5, 1974 at 260-61.
" The emphasis on union collective bargaining activities is unmistakable.
Leaders of organized labor have stressed the fact that in the absence of such
provisions many employees sharing the benefits of what unions are able to ac-
complish by collective bargaining will refuse to pay their share of the cost. S.
REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 5-7 (1947); International Ass'n of Machin-
ists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 759-62 (1961).
' International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 761 (1961).
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of criteria with which to test the lawfulness of spreading particular
costs to compulsory contributors. Exclusionary tests may be rough-
ly categorized according to a constitutional predicate.
When utilizing Fifth Amendment standards to evaluate specific
union activities to determine whether or not the associated costs
may be imposed upon dissenters, one would ask the following
types of questions:
1. Is the activity related to negotiations with the employer
for wages, hours, and working conditions?
2. Is the activity rooted in the collective agreement or the
collective bargaining relationship, such as contract interpre-
tation or grievance handling?
3. Are the expenditures associated with the activity necessary
to the union's performance of its collective bargaining
functions?
4. Does the activity benefit the dissenters?
Even if the costs of a given activity qualify as collective bar-
gaining costs according to the foregoing tests, First Amendment
hurdles must be crossed. If compulsory financial participation in
the activity would impose political or ideological conformity, or
otherwise effect an infringement of associational freedoms, the
dissenter must be protected from that participation. If the statute
is not construed to provide this protection, the statute itself must
fall. It is impossible to reach any other conclusion if the "compell-
ing governmental interest""' test is properly applied. As the statute
does not even require collective bargaining, a fortiori, there is no
public interest in forcing financial support of a collective bargain-
ing agent which can override the uninhibited exercise of constitu-
tional liberties."'6
Many, if not most, union activities which are found to be ex-
traneous to the statutorily authorized realm of collective bargain-
ing functions run afoul of a combination of the foregoing exclu-
sionary tests, as demonstrated by the following examples. Con-
tributions to affiliates, charities and other organizations generally
15. See generally, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516 (1945); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
" But see Gray v. Gulf M. & O.R.R., 429 F.2d 1064, 1072 (5th Cir. 1970).
Gray may be largely irrelevant, however, as the plaintiff therein refused to pay
any fees to his union representative.
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entail financial support of political activities, and associations
with groups taking one-sided ideological or economic positions.'
The recipients of these funds almost invariably lack a bargaining
relationship with the dissenter's employer. The result is not simply
a forced association, but the deprivation of funds which dissenters
could otherwise utilize for the support of groups or purposes of
their own choosing."8 Entertainment expenses may be foreclosed
from compulsory support simply because they are unnecessary for
the conduct of collective bargaining. Compulsory payment to death
benefit plans may be voided because of their lack of any relation-
ship with the dissenter's employment context. Such plans are not
negotiated with employers; their entire cost is paid by the union
members and agency fee payers. Organizing expenses will almost
certainly conflict with several exclusionary tests. Organizing costs
within the dissenter's bargaining unit are virtually nonexistent, as
the controversy would not arise in the absence of a provision com-
pelling all unit employees to join the union or pay fees to it.
Accordingly, solicitation of membership is unnecessary. Further-
more, union organizing activities are steeped in ideological com-
mitment-a commitment which the dissenter, by the very nature
of his status, opposes.
The Ellis defendants asserted that it is entirely proper to compel
financial support for a great many of the activities interdicted by
the summary judgment on the ground that those activities promote
"solidarity and harmonious relationships" which redound to the
general benefit of the bargaining unit. The lack of persuasiveness
inherent in that contention is revealed by focusing upon a dissen-
ter's constitutional rights to decide for himself what is to his benefit,
and to exercise the prerogative to support positions or activities
which may detrimentally affect him in some sense, but which
nevertheless exert a superior claim upon his loyalties. An employee
whose impending wage increase is blocked by a wage and price
freeze may still approve of this action, based upon the conviction
that such a measure serves the national economic health: "[l]t is
the essence of the First Amendment rights [of association], which
the parties exercise that they may make their own contrary (and
15 Good v. Associated Students of the Univ. of Wash., 86 Wash. 2d 94, 542
P.2d 762 (1975).
111Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996, 1001 (9th Cir. 1970).
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rational) judgments without interference from the courts.....
In short, the pursuit of "solidarity and harmonious relationships"
is not an objective dissenters share with those to whom they must
pay union dues or fees. As to costs necessitated by union activities
beyond the pale of collective bargaining, there is neither a statutory
warrant nor a logical predicate for insisting that unions are entitled
to a share of dissenters' wages in order to facilitate union pursuit
of such private objectives.
The Ellis court appropriately separated chargeable costs from
those of non-collective bargaining activities which lack statutory
sanction. Confirmation of this assessment comes from an improb-
able source, the General Counsel of the United Auto Workers,
who greeted the Ellis decision as follows:
No union can exist on those terms. The decision has a tremendous
effect on all unions and on the quality of life in the country because
of the way it restricts the role unions can play in working for social
change!"0
Congress was never advised that unions sought payment from
alleged "free riders" in order to secure the funds to underwrite
sweeping programs aimed at "social change." The commitment
inherent in financial support of the programs of political and social
activism favored by union officers is precisely the sort of "ideologi-
cal conformity" which unions are forbidden from imposing upon
dissenters."'
VII. SCOPE OF UNIT AS TO WHICH COSTS MAY BE IMPOSED
Once the preliminary delineation of non-collective bargaining
activities has been accomplished, another difficult question arises.
Within what scope of the union organization are costs imposable
upon a given group of dissenters? Neither the statutes (RLA and
NLRA) nor the decisions interpreting them have attempted to
circumscribe the function unit whose costs may be imposed upon
dissenters.
The most feasible cost pool alternatives include the following:
(a) union-wide bargaining costs;
159 Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 588 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1147 (1976).
e Bus. WEEK, Feb. 16, 1976, at 26 (emphasis supplied).
161 Railway Employes' Dep't, AFL v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956).
COMPULSORY UNION DUES
(b) bargaining costs within the industry employing the plain-
tiff dissenters;
(c) all bargaining costs of the specific organization certified
to represent the dissenters;1..
(d) only those collective bargaining costs of the certified
representative that relates to the dissenters' employer; or
(e) costs of all union organizations which participate in bar-
gaining with the dissenters' employer, for the unit em-
ploying those dissenters.
As the perimeter of the cost pool widens, problems of accounting
and allocation become vastly more complex and burdensome.
Some guidance may be derived from the definition of "collective
bargaining" set forth in section 8(d) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, which emphasizes the relationship between a given
employer and the representatives of its employees:
[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obliga-
tion of the employer and the representative of the employees to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising there-
under, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any
agreement reached if requested by either party. . .. '"
A limitation of cost pool boundaries encompassing only those
expenditures connected with bargaining with the dissenters' em-
ployer is compatible with the position taken by union spokesmen
in originally urging congressional approval of compulsory financial
support. Congress was importuned to permit the extraction of an
employee's wages to defray the costs of representing him in his
own employment. The principal argument asserted by unions in
pursuit of statutory authorization for the union shop was the exist-
ence of the duty of fair representation, which obligates an exclusive
bargaining representative to fairly and equally represent all persons
" From an accounting standpoint, judicial selection of this alternative will
simplify accounting problems where the certified representative is a relatively
small local union. This is most often the case under the NLRA while it is com-
monplace for RLA certification to be granted to an international union. As to
the latter situation, serious legal and accounting problems will persist, as discussed
in the following text.
16329 U.S.C. S 158(d) (1970).
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employed within the bargaining unit."" It was the cost of that repre-
sentation which unions sought to spread among the bargaining
unit members, not the costs of providing similar services for em-
ployees in an unrelated industry, or those in a remote geographic
area, whose bargaining might be conducted by a local union orga-
nization having only remote affiliation through the separate vertical
ties to an international headquarters with the unit employing a
given group of alleged "free riders."
To illustrate the pertinent considerations, I refer to a hypo-
thetical example. Assume that dissenters A, B, and C are employed
by the Smith Company, a manufacturer of jewelry. A, B, and C,
are agency fee payers, contributing amounts under protest to
Local 3 of the Amalgamated Workers Union, a large union repre-
senting diverse employee skills throughout the country through a
large network of regional organizations and subordinate local
unions. Then assume that employees D, E, and F work for the
Jones Company, which is located in the same city as the Smith
Company, and that those employees are similarly represented by
Local 3. No union security provision, however, has been negotiated
with the Jones Company as prolonged and costly negotiations have
been unproductive. Somewhere across the country, Local 1000 of
the Amalgamated Workers Union represents a unit of gas station
employees, including G, H, and I. As in the case of the Jones
Company, Local 1000 has been unable to negotiate union security
provisions.
If union-wide collective bargaining costs are recoverable from
dissenters, A, B, and C will be required to defray a portion of
the bargaining expenses related to each of the other employee
groups. In terms of responding to the statutory objectives, manda-
tory payment of collective bargaining costs for employees D, E and
F is as grotesque a result as it is for the gas station workers. It
was never suggested to Congress that successful negotiation of an
agency shop agreement with a given employer would impose an
obligation upon his employees to defray union collective bargain-
ing expenditures for any other group of persons the union repre-
sented.
The irrational result that would follow from an obligation to
' International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 760-61 (1961).
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defray costs outside of the unit in which a given group of dissenters
is employed can be most easily perceived by hypothesizing an ex-
treme example. Expanding upon the facts set forth above, assume
that the Amalgamated Workers Union represents 500,000 em-
ployees nationwide, but the very first agency shop agreement it
has been able to obtain is that with the Smith Company. Further
assume that the nationwide percentage of membership per bargain-
ing unit is sixty percent, leaving 200,000 alleged "free riders" for
whom collective bargaining costs are incurred. It is implausible
to suggest that A, B and C, by virtue of the agreement between
Local 3 and the Smith Company, are lawfully burdened with a
share of the collective bargaining costs for the other 200,000 em-
ployees who reject union membership. It can scarcely be doubted
that such a result would severely offend Fifth Amendment guar-
antees.
As I am concerned with the establishment of a principle of law,
it matters not that these hypothetical facts are, at least in the latter
instance, improbable; the nature of the dissenter's obligation is not
governed by the infinite variation of considerations such as the
amount of costs incurred by his union or its affiliates in negotiating
for other groups of employees. The only rule of law that squares
with the intent of Congress and with the arguments advanced by
the unions in seeking the authority to financially obligate workers
is that the costs subject to compulsory sharing are those directly
related to bargaining with a dissenter's own employer.
The validity of the principle that dissenters may only be re-
quired to share costs of bargaining with their employer is demon-
strated by a parallel analysis of the duty of fair representation.
Plainly, that duty does not obligate a union to represent employees
with any entity other than their own employer."' Again, it was the
cost of that representation which unions sought to spread among
those to whom the duty was owed. Taking the unions' own argu-
ments, it can readily be seen that the scope of the duty to repre-
sent and the scope of the duty to pay for that representation are
congruent.
A formidable Fifth Amendment barrier impedes the imposition
of union-wide bargaining costs of international unions. Many labor
165Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944).
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organizations have a substantial Canadian membership component.
Such unions frequently hold exclusive representative status for
Canadian bargaining units, which units may include some alleged
"free riders," for whom bargaining costs are incurred."' Imposing
even a small portion of those costs upon American dissenters
through compulsory dues or fees stretches the notion of minimizing
labor strife into a shape that must be incompatible with the Con-
stitution. Congress neither intended to, nor could, withdraw wages
from employees in the United States to foster "labor stability" in
foreign lands. On the contrary, the courts have taken some pains
to insulate international commerce from the effects of labor rela-
tions policies promulgated by the NRLA:
The whole background of the Act is concerned with industrial
strife between American employers and employees .... What was
said [in Congress] inescapably describes the boundaries of the Act
as including only the workingmen of our own country and its
possessions.'1
Ellis.. can certainly be constructed to contemplate the imposi-
tion of a cost obligation for union-wide activities meeting the
court's functional criteria of collective bargaining. It is too early
to make a definitive interpretation of the court's approach, how-
ever, as the basis of computing the plaintiffs' damages was not
developed.
VIII. LIMITATIONS UPON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
EXPENDITURES
A. Excessive Costs
None of the cases has ruled upon the issue of a dissenter's lia-
bility for proportional payment of collective bargaining costs which
are excessive. At least until such time as the categories of impos-
able costs have been further clarified, it is unlikely that significant
challenges on this point will be raised. Neither the RLA nor the
NLRA address this question directly, but it is probable that the
'" CAN. REV. STAT. c. L-1, Part V, Industrial Relations, 116(a) (1970).
167Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 143-44 (1957);
accord, McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S.
10 (1963).
16891 L.R.R.M. 2339 (S.D. Cal. 1976).
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developing doctrine of fair representation will be expanded to
encompass claims that a labor organization is afflicting dissenters
with wasteful or extravagant expenditures.
The union's duty with regard to a dissenter's financial obliga-
tion is that of a fiduciary, ' and the application of rules of law
which have long been accepted in other controversies involving
fiduciaries seems probable. As the union's fiduciary duty requires
it to represent nonmembers "in utmost good faith and fairness,""1 *
it can scarcely be argued that excessive collective bargaining ex-
penditures are made in good faith as to employees who have regis-
tered their protests against all compulsory contributions.
B. Exclusion of Compulsory Payers From Participation in Collec-
tive Bargaining Activities
The common union practice of excluding nonmembers from
participating in collective bargaining activities affecting them gives
rise to a provocative question: does that exclusion from collective
bargaining activities negate or reduce the nonmember's financial
obligation?
On only one occasion has this issue received direct attention.
In a proceeding determining the amount of costs for union "serv-
ices rendered in negotiating and administering an agreement"
pursuant to the Hawaii statute governing teachers, the Chairman
of the Hawaii Public Employment Relations Board remarked that
he was deeply troubled by the exclusion of agency fee payers
from negotiations concerning their own employment:
Further, union members have voting power which permits them
some voice in policy determinations made by the union's leader-
ship including those as to how their money is spent. Nonmembers
have no voice in these matters. This is akin to taxation without
representation. While the value of this participation in policy mak-
ing has no tangible dollar value, I feel that it must be realized that
it has some value, the recognition of which should result in dues
being somewhat higher than service fees." '
169Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 533 F.2d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 1976);
Reid v. United Auto Workers, 479 F.2d 517, 518 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1076 (1973).
I" Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 1970).
17 In re Hawaii State Teachers Ass'n, No. 36, at 12-13 (Hawaii Public Em-
ployment Relations Board 1973) (concurring opinion).
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The rationale tentatively advanced by Chairman Hamada is
readily configured into a claim of constitutional infringement; or
at minimum, derogation of employees' statutory rights. Further
development and application of the Hamada rationale is probable,
as the operative facts are present in nearly every context giving
rise to a suit challenging compulsory union financial obligations.
IX. A CRITIQUE OF EXISTING REMEDIES
A. The Futility of Spending Litigation From the Employees'
Standpoint
A review of background information is helpful in preparing an
analysis of existing remedies for union spending of dissenters' dues
and fees on non-collective bargaining activities. One might con-
clude that the problem posed by such spending is insubstantial if
not innocuous, in light of the paucity of spending suits. But a
realistic evaluation demands both longer-range and more detailed
views.
Vast numbers of the American workforce have consistently re-
jected union representation, in the face of immense governmental
pressure to submit to an exclusive collective bargaining agent.
Despite this long-applied pressure, and the membership entice-
ments flourished by today's well-financed labor organizations, em-
ployees continue to reject union representation in droves. "
Why, then, haven't the innumerable dissenters sought relief
through litigation? One primary reason is the deceptive statutory
terminology, often repeated in collective bargaining agreements,
which not only authorizes a requirement of full equivalent dues pay-
ments to those opposed to a union, but further explicates the obliga-
tion as one of "membership. 1.. Just how is an employee to acquire
the perception that Congress meant "payment of fees." when it said
"membership;" and that "the periodic dues and fees uniformly re-
quired as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership ' .o
really means only the payment of collective bargaining costs? In
172 In fiscal year 1975, union representation was rejected in 50% of the NLRB
elections. This rebuff is even more apparent when one realizes that unions do
not proceed through the election stage absent a significant expectation of victory.
90 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 383 (1975).
7'See discussion at notes 27 through 31, supra.
17429 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
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short, Congress misled American employees in at least these two
vital respects, and the courts have been unwilling to say so. To
avoid whatever sociological disasters it may have imagined would
follow from recognition of pre-eminent constitutional rights, the
Supreme Court has resorted to disingenuous statutory interpreta-
tion,"7 5 coupled with severe restrictions upon traditional judicial
remedies. The anticipated result has, of course, followed as unions
continue to force employees into union membership, spend com-
pulsory dues and fees unstintingly on politics, exert similar or
greater coercion on other employees and on a vast range of insti-
tutional programs and activities having no criterion of public inter-
est other than the favor of union officers.
Union hostility to potential and actual dissenters has been sub-
stantial, often subsiding only when some paramount union interest
would be jeopardized by continuing adherence to that policy. A
brief resume of the spending litigations illustrates this point, as
well as that of the described judicial disinterest in rectifying inva-
sions of employee rights.
The principal defendant in Street, the Brotherhood of Railway
Clerks, litigated that case for eleven years. The same union was
again the principal defendant in Allen, and litigated that case for
eleven years. In each instance, when confronted with the prospect
of having to make full disclosure with regard to the use of com-
pulsory dues, the union responded by returning all funds paid by
the plaintiffs, and relieving them of future obligations.'
17- Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Street, 367 U.S. at 786, pungently ob-
served that: "[N]o one has suggested that the Court's statutory construction of
§ 2, Eleventh could possibly be supported without the crutch of its fear of un-
constitutionality."
16 The Street case was filed on June 5, 1953, and final judgment was not en-
tered until December 29, 1964, sub nom. Looper v. Georgia S. & F. Ry., No.
16,537 (Ga. Super. Ct., Dec. 29, 1964). BRAC was one of the eight defendant
unions party to the stipulation incorporated as part of the final judgment. As
such, BRAC agreed to refund "all dues, fees and assessments" paid by the plain-
tiffs and intervening plaintiffs prior to final judgment and agreed that all plain-
tiffs who so elected would henceforth "not be required, as a condition of em-
ployment by a railroad defendant to acquire or maintain membership in any
labor union defendant pursuant to any union shop agreement under the Railway
Labor Act." Id. at 2-3. The Allen case was filed on June 8, 1953. Allen v. South-
ern Ry., 249 N.C. 491, 107 S.E.2d 125 (1959). BRAC was one of the two de-
fendant unions against whom judgment was originally entered by the trial court,
Allen v. Southern Ry., 42 L.R.R.M. 2175 (N.C. Super. Ct. 1958), and who
appealed that judgment to the United States Supreme Court. 373 U.S. 113. The
case was dismissed on remand on November 14, 1964, because the defendant
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Reid' was filed in 1967, and notwithstanding the valid claims
asserted for political expenditures made over protest, the case
terminated in 1973 without judgment having been entered against
the defendant union, based on a union promise to analyze its po-
litical costs and voluntarily rebate them to dissenters. One searches
in vain for any statutory or common law authority endowing a
fiduciary who has admittedly misspent funds with the power to
determine how much he has misspent, and if, how and when re-
dress shall be accorded.
Seay was also filed in 1967. Although pending for nine years,
it has not been tried; the second trial court reversal by the Ninth
Circuit has just occurred.' After six years of litigation, again with
regard to unarguably valid claims for political expenditures, the
Machinists "saw the handwriting on the wall"'" and followed the
Reid tactic of announcing a rebate plan, in Circular 669. That
circular was issued on June 28, 1973, and it provides that the
union "shall" refund political expenditures; earlier protests were to
be honored retroactively."* No contingency is stated in Circular
669 which could hinder the promised refunds. Almost three years
later a major IAM officer admitted that not one cent had been
refunded as provided in the Circular.""
Ellis has been in litigation for more than three years,' during
which time the litigation record and evidence have grown to fill
approximately a dozen file drawers. In addition to the tremendous
investment of attorney hours in the case, the services of several re-
search personnel and two certified public accountants have been
unions rejected the plaintiffs' tender of "the amount of their respective dues,
fees, and assessments accrued to date ..... . agreed that they would not enforce
the union shop agreement against the plaintiffs, and excused the plaintiffs "from
payment of any dues, fees, or assessments to said defendants . . . " Allen v.
Southern Ry., 58 L.R.R.M. 2094, 2095 (N.C. Super. Ct. 1964).
'
7 Supra note 6. Reid v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 443 F.2d 408 (10th Cir.
1971), later proceedings sub nor. Reid v. United Auto Workers, 80 L.R.R.M.
2886 (N.D. Okla. 1972), afl'd, 479 F.2d 517 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1076 (1973).
1'8 533 F.2d 1126. This Ninth Circuit decision is dated Mar. 31, 1976.
'19 371 F. Supp. at 760, quoting Reid II, 479 F.2d at 520.
188 533 F.2d at 1128-29.
181 General Vice President William Winpisinger, testifying in behalf of an TAM
motion for summary judgment on Mar. 3, 1976, in Marden v. International Ass'n
of Machinists, No. 75-456-Civ-WM (S.D. Fla.), at Transcript 36-37, 39-40.
182 91 L.R.R.M. at 2340.
1976] COMPULSORY UNION DUES
indispensable. The costs of this litigation have been termed "stag-
gering" by one union officer, with ample justification."u
There are no shortcuts in spending cases. If voluminous evidence
is not obtained, analyzed and presented, essential issues will go
unanswered, as was the case in Hanson, Street and Allen. As the
foregoing cases illustrate, the unions have engaged dissenters in a
war of attrition; a war in which the odds are heavily weighted
against the employee-plaintiffs. Not only is the union in control of
its expenditure records, it is in a position to refrain from keeping
descriptive records.1" Union resistance is financed from substantial
treasuries; ironically, a significant part of those financial resources
is obtained from other compulsory contributors and from these self-
same plaintiffs whose claims are met with such unrelenting oppo-
sition.
Additional reasons deterring spending suits abound, but it is
felt that the point is adequately established without further detail.'"
-8 Mellon deposition dated Jan. 23, 1975 at Exhibit 10, filed in Ellis v. BRAC
and Fails v. BRAC, Nos. 73-113-N and 73-118-N (S.D. Cal.).
184 Financial statements filed with the Secretary of Labor pursuant to the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. S 431 (1970), gen-
erally lack comprehensive descriptive information.
1 The fearsome cost of prosecuting a spending suit has a massive inhibitory
effect upon would-be plaintiffs. Expenditures for attorneys' fees, accountants and
other expert witnesses, reearch personnel, depositions, and the like run into the
hundreds of thousands of dollars. Rank and file employees simply lack the where-
withal to undertake such litigation, unless supported by an outside source. At
present, the sole institutional source of support for plaintiffs in spending cases
is being provided by the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, a
non-profit private charitable corporation headquartered in Fairfax, Virginia.
Yet another serious hindrance to employees desirous of filing a spending suit
is the relative unavailability of adequate counsel. The plaintiffs' attorney must be
thoroughly trained in labor law, as a detailed knowledge of the following ele-
ments is essential: the various labor statutes and their underlying legislative his-
tories, labor policy as administered by regulatory agencies such as the National
Labor Relations Board, and operating practices of labor unions on a broad scale.
A sensitivity to judicially formulated labor policy is indispensable. Attorneys
possessing this background and experience are not found in many areas of the
country. When they can be located, they are almost invariably engaged in rep-
resenting union clients or management clients, and for various reasons are un-
willing to embark upon such litigation. In the case of union attorneys, under-
taking such litigation would be extremely harmful to the lawyer's standing with
his regular clientele. Many management lawyers lack any genuine concern for
the largely intangible rights of employees at issue in such cases, and they can
rarely afford the massive time commitments that must be made in such cases.
Finally, there is the apathy barrier to consider. In the absence of an innovative,
adequate remedy for the use of dissenters' dues for non-collective bargaining ac-
tivities, such employees face the virtually certain propect of litigating their rights
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As the reader considers the following discussion of remedies, it is
interesting to note the degree to which governmental action or
inaction reinforces the union's antipathy to dissenters who seek
redress for non-collective bargaining expenditures from their com-
pulsory dues and fees.
B. Unfair Labor Practice Proceedings
1. NLRA Remedies-Questionable
Although Detroit Mailers... imparts substantial doubt as to the
availability of relief through NLRB proceedings, it is entirely pos-
sible that the current Board, if afforded the opportunity, would
consign that decision to well-deserved obscurity. That opportunity
may never arise, however, because consideration of such a case
might be blocked by the General Counsel's refusal to issue a
complaint.18
In analogous circumstances, a finding of employer and union
unfair labor practices has been judicially sustained. In a hiring
hall case,188 "permit men" working through the hall were charged
the exact equivalent of union members' dues. The charge of un-
lawful coercion was predicated upon diversion of a large part of
the hiring hall fees to union institutional expenses. The union
countered that permit men receive all benefits received by union
members except the right to attend union meetings, and accord-
ingly argued that the equivalent charges were legal. This argument
met short shrift in the Second Circuit:
We think it is clear that charging permit men a fee for the use of
the hiring hall which is equivalent to the dues paid by union mem-
bers on the theory that permit men receive all the benefits of union
membership will necessarily encourage union membership in vio-
for what must seem an interminable time, with the only relief being a modest
return of amounts long since withheld from the employees' paychecks. The in-
tangible injuries of forced association, which are often those most keenly resented,
are not redressable on a post hoc basis.
IN 192 N.L.R.B. 951 (1971).
187 The General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board has virtually
unfettered discretion over the decision to issue or refrain from issuing a complaint
of unfair labor practices. United Electrical Contractors' Ass'n v. Ordman, 59
L.R.R.M. 2690 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); cf. Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473
(1964).
188NLRB v. Local 138, Operating Engineers, 385 F.2d 874, 876 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904 (1968).
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lation of the permit men's § 157 rights; likewise, it will encourage
employers to discriminate against employees so as to encourage
union membership. 8
The court went on to condemn the union's efforts to use the hiring
hall to gain members, commenting that:
[C]ongress has provided unions with a specific means for meeting
the problem of 'free riders' which Local 138 has here tried to
meet through the exclusive hiring hall. If the union wants union
security, it may bargain for it. It may not short-circuit the system
Congress has established by attempting to gain union security
through an exclusive hiring hall."
In essence, the court found that the union acted unlawfully in pro-
viding the permit men with unwanted "benefits" and demanding
payment for those "benefits." The resulting encouragement of union
membership found above is precisely the same encouragement that
exists in an agency shop context, where nonmembers are generally
excluded not only from the intangible benefit of participation in
the process that governs their own employment conditions, but
from participation in economic programs such as death benefits
and strike benefits to which they contribute equally with union
members.1 '
Indeed, it is not necessary to show that an agency fee payer was
excluded from participation in non-collective bargaining activities
in order to establish the commission of an unfair labor practice:
The Supreme Court has said as clearly as possible that agency fees
exacted from employees under the terms of the bargaining agree-
ment must be limited to use in sharing the costs with other dues
of 'negotiating and administering collective agreements, and the
costs of the adjustment [sic] and settlement of disputes."92
If there is a statutory limitation upon the use of dissenters' con-
tributions, any diversion of such funds to non-collective bargaining
expenditures is necessarily an unlawful membership encourage-
ment regardless of whether or not the payer is permitted to share
in the activity being subsidized. If the payments are not made will-
189 Id. at 877 (footnote omitted).
Id.
'g See discussion at notes 63 through 69 supra.
192 Scay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 1970)
(footnote omitted).
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ingly, and the activity is beyond the statutory perimeter of col-
lective bargaining, the payer's section 71. rights are infringed.
2. RLA Remedies-Nonexistent
In contrast to potential meager relief available to a dissenter
whose employment is governed by the NLRA, the railway and
airline workers have been totally abandoned. The RLA is utterly
silent as to proscriptions upon union conduct. Employers are for-
bidden to coerce union membership upon pain of stiff criminal
sanctions, but only unions are statutorily empowered to seek those
sanctions."'
3. Litigation Remedies
In Street, the Court seized upon the idea of a proportional re-
duction in dissenters' dues to prevent future violations. Injunctive
relief was discouraged, on the wholly speculative premise that
industrial stability would crumble if any controls were placed upon
the flow of dissenters' funds to their unwanted union representa-
tives."' The illusory nature of the proportional dues reduction
remedy was keenly exposed in Mr. Justice Black's dissent:
It may be that courts and lawyers with sufficient skill in accounting,
algebra, geometry, trigonometry and calculus will be able to extract
the proper microscopic answer from the voluminous and complex
accounting records of the local, national and international unions
involved. It seems to me, however, that while the Court's remedy
may prove very lucrative to special masters, accountants and
lawyers, this formula, with its attendant trial burdens, promises
little hope for financial recompense to the individual workers
whose First Amendment freedoms have been flagrantly violated.""
This prophetic comment squares nicely with the course of litigation
described above,"' and with a union lawyer's statement some eight
3 29 U.S.C. S 157 (1970).
19445 U.S.C. § 152, Tenth (1970). In Cornell University, 183 N.L.R.B. 329,
333 (1970), the Board condemned state labor-management legislation as "inade-
quate" because "it contain[ed] no remedies for unfair labor practices which may
be committed by unions,"
19 367 U.S. at 771-75. Accord, Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S.
113, 120 (1963).
110 367 U.S. at 795-96.
197 See discussion at notes 177 through 185 supra.
COMPULSORY UNION DUES
years later, reporting that the obligations imposed upon unions by
Street and Allen had gone unobserved.'"
The accounting considerations adverted to by Mr. Justice Black
are central to the conduct and result of a spending suit. Several
random points must be recognized. Employees almost never have
reliable information concerning the purposes upon which their dues
are expended; local union officers frequently are in the same posi-
tion. Claims are often retroactive to a much earlier protest, and
chief union officers may be unable to recall pertinent information.
Local union financial ledgers may be partially missing or in chaos
and when they exist, little if any descriptive information is re-
vealed. Finally, minutes of meetings, if retained, are frequently
fragmentary.
In Ellis, plaintiffs' counsel successfully obtained an order com-
pelling disclosure of several years' minutes of BRAC Executive
Council meetings. In the minutes of March 10, 1972, International
Secretary-Treasurer D. J. Sullivan presented a candid appraisal of
the union's financial condition and its accounting practices. He
pointed out the misuse of United States government funds; lax
practices on handling charitable contributions, supply purchas-
ing and inventory control; diversion of earmarked funds for gen-
eral operating expenses; and lack of accounting controls over ex-
pense accounts, use of union vehicles, and more. One week later,
International President C. L. Dennis announced a new policy for-
bidding verbatim minutes or tape recordings at Executive Council
meetings."' The result, of course, is that subsequent minutes mean
practically nothing to anyone who was not present. Entries are
terse and sensitive subjects are not even mentioned. It is impossible
to follow the flow of dissenters' funds in the face of such practices.
The Supreme Court had at least limited insight into the prob-
lems of evidentiary accumulation that would beset dissenters. The
Court's solution was to place the burden upon the union of proving
the amount of political expenditures.'"" One might be inclined to
view that partial solution as a futile gesture, because it could well
:" See Gromfine, supra note 3.
9 Minutes of Executive Council Meetings of March 10, 1972, at 33-41, and
March 17, 1972 at 1, filed in conjunction with affidavit of Susan R. Meisinger
dated Aug. 21, 1972, in Ellis v. BRAC and Fails v. BRAC, Nos. 73-113-N and
73-118-N (S.D. Cal.).
2'"Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 122 (1963).
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operate in a fashion that appeared to reduce the plaintiffs' burden,
but did not in fact do so. Thus, if the union presented a compre-
hensive analysis of its non-collective bargaining spending, the
plaintiffs would have a Hobson's choice of accepting it at face
value or engaging in thorough discovery that would establish the
wrongfully spent amounts-in essence, bearing the burden which
had ostensibly been placed upon the union. The only way that
this result can be avoided is to attach consequences of severity
to a union's erroneous computation of its non-collective bargaining
expenditures. Plaintiffs will never under any circumstances be in
a position to establish the amount of non-collective bargaining
spending as accurately as can the union, but they can conduct
sufficient discovery to test the union computations. If those com-
putations are misleading, or incomplete, it ought not to be up to
the plaintiffs to correct the proffered figures, or fill in the account-
ing gap--plaintiffs simply lack the ability to do so, regardless of
the extent of discovery permitted. The only plausible solution is
to penalize a union which presents inaccurate figures by requiring
it to disgorge the entirety of dues paid by the dissenters involved
in the litigation.
If a full dues disgorgement remedy were granted, the plaintiffs
involved in that case would at least have their direct financial losses
occasioned by non-collective bargaining expenditures from their
dues and fees redressed. For the sake of this analysis, it is assumed
that some portion of dues and fees paid by those plaintiffs was
expended properly upon collective bargaining in their behalf.
Union disgorgement of that portion would function as a penalty,
as noted.
It is doubtful, however, that the penalty would be of sufficient
consequence to function as a deterrent against similar union
statutory violations. As discussed above, the number of spending
suits is so small that unions can easily afford the financial conse-
quences of a full disgorgement remedy to the few employees in-
volved. When one considers that a significant portion of the dues
and fees must be returned for non-collective bargaining expendi-
tures, it can readily be perceived that a disgorgement remedy
would not provide a strong incentive to comply with the dissenters'
protests regarding the use of their compulsory dues and fees.
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Two of the unions having closest involvement in spending suits
have shown what may be typical recalcitrance in dealing with dis-
senters' claims. Thus the IAM has steadfastly refused to return
members' money spent upon politics, notwithstanding its adoption
in 1973 of a rebate scheme purporting to make annual refunds of
such amounts."' BRAC, the other prominent figure in spending
suits, has disclosed its hostility to dissenters even more conspicu-
ously. In 1974, BRAC enacted a political expenditure rebate
scheme, and in reliance thereon, filed a motion for summary
judgment in Ellis. That motion was denied, as the court found
that the rebate scheme contained a "standard for refunds of dues
and agency fees" which the court held to be "erroneous as a matter
of law. . . ."' Subsequently, the BRAC rebate device, which had
been issued as a presidential policy statement, was enacted as a
constitutional amendment' verbatim, notwithstanding its having
been judicially condemned.
While there is no accurate way to predict whether or not such
attitudes and actions are typical of labor unions, it is noted that in
each instance litigation was pending against the IAM and BRAC
concurrently with the described developments. Yet neither orga-
nization made even a superficial attempt to accommodate the dis-
senters' rights in issue.
Two other unions, the United Auto Workers and the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, have
adopted rebate schemes designed to refund at least a portion of
the political expenditures made by those organizations. The UAW
scheme met tentative judicial approval in Reid II, and the
AFSCME plan has not drawn judicial comment, insofar as it
purports to accommodate dissenters' claims for expenditures of
their dues and fees on non-collective bargaining activities.
If there is any substance to the threat to "labor stability"
201 Testimony of IAM General Vice President William Wipisinger in Tran-
script of Hearing, March 3, 1976, at 36-37, in Marden v. International Associa-
tion of Machinists, No. 75-456-Civ-WM, in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida.
202 Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, dated January
6, 1974 at 1-2.
203 Constitution of the Grand Lodge of the Brotherhood of Railway, Airline
and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees, Article
28, at 63-66 (1975).
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imagined by the Supreme Court in Street and Allenf" it cannot
be denied that the penalty proposed would contribute to this un-
desirable result. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's concern about
"labor stability" being threatened by inhibiting the flow of coerced
dues and fees was speculative; no facts were before the Court to
establish that proposition. Worse yet, the judicial speculation rested
solely upon a congressional assumption that "labor stability"
could not be achieved without extracting compulsory contributions
from dissenters. One will search the legislative history of the Rail-
way Labor Act in vain for a cogent factual presentation supporting
the "labor stability" proposition.
While purporting to burden unions with the obligation to ac-
count for misspent dues and fees, the Allen Court eased the pain-
ful effects by softening the requisite accounting standards: "Abso-
lute precision in the calculation of such proportions [of political
expenditures] is not, of course, to be expected or required; we are
mindful of the difficult acounting problems that may arise. '
There seems to be no alternative construction that can be placed
upon the foregoing quotation other than that a dissenter whose
wages are extracted by a union with the full intention of expending
them upon political purposes he opposes has no claim for the re-
turn of the entirety of the misspent amounts; it is enough that some
meaningful gesture at restitution is made. No legal predicate is
asserted for this astounding proposition-it is simply Court-made
policy that union actions are endowed with a conclusive presump-
tion of societal worth transcending unequivocal injuries to em-
ployees. It is suggested that the untrammeled exercise of constitu-
tional rights must be accorded greater weight than convenience
for union accountants.
The post-Street history demonstrates that, unless unions are en-
joined from the misuse of dissenters' dues and fees, such misspend-
ing will continue on a wholesale basis. The recoverability of actual
damages, achieved only after exorbitantly expensive, exhausting
litigation is a remedy in name only. It is difficult to conceive that
the continued spending of dissenters' fees on non-collective bar-
gaining purposes is anything other than bad faith action on the
part of the union. The consequences of that bad faith dealing ought
204367 U.S. at 771; 373 U.S. at 120.
202 373 U.S. at 122.
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to include exposure for punitive damages and the award of attor-
neys' fees to dissenters.
The reluctance to award punitive damages to a union breaching
its fiduciary duty is one of the significant ironies of court-fashioned
labor relations policy, particularly in view of the fact that the in-
jury inflicted upon the employee by the compulsory representative
may have serious consequences which entail only modest financial
loss. Under such circumstances, an award of actual damages is an
ineffectual remedy. One case has tentatively approached this issue,
saying that: "Assuming arguendo, that there will be instances in
which punitive damages are proper in a § 301 or unfair representa-
tion action...." The facts of this case, however, were not found
to be of the "outrageous or extraordinary" character requiring such
extraordinary remedies.2"
In this writer's opinion, the persistent and pervasive practice of
ignoring dissenterse complaints, and diverting their compulsory
dues and fees to a variety of non-collective bargaining activities
has, in the eyes of the law, an outrageous and extraordinary char-
acter. A potential award of exemplary damages would serve well
as a deterrent to unions having no regard for the rights of those
to whom a fiduciary obligation is owed. By the same token, union
exposure to attorneys' fees for bad faith dealing would recognize
the equities present in such conflicts."0
Meaningful redress for dissenters' claims requires more than
the recoverability of damages and attorneys' fees, however. If a
union is free to continue the diversion of a plaintiffs' compulsory
dues in the future to its non-collective bargaining activities, it is
neither feasible nor desirable to require the institution of successive
suits for damages. Truly effective relief must encompass the issu-
ance of an injunction, just as is done with regard to recalcitrant
employers who deprive their workers of wages required by the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).'" In fact, it may readily be
seen that the employee is injured more severely by the diversion
2
"Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442, 454 (8th Cir.
1975).
207 Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
208 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1970). The rationale for the issuance of injunctive relief
is well stated in Hodgson v. Ricky Fashions, Inc., 434 F.2d 1261, 1263 (5th Cir.
1970).
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of his wages through fees and dues to non-collective bargaining
activities than he is by having his paycheck shortchanged by his
employer, as the union is using at least a portion of his dues and
fees for political and ideological purposes he opposes.
The appropriateness of granting injunctive relief is even clearer
when one considers that FLSA violations are investigated and
prosecuted by the government. The lack of litigation resources
which dissenters encounter renders it that much more likely that
violations of their rights will occur and persist, in contrast to the
parallel situation of FLSA violations."'
Street and Allen did not rule out the grant of injunctive relief
in spending litigation, although they made it plain that other
methods were preferred. To the extent that they did contemplate
injunctive relief, however, it was directed at prohibiting improper
expenditures, not the collection of dues in the first instance."" If
the Court intended to thereby lay down a hard and fast rule pro-
hibiting injunctions which would interdict the collection of com-
pulsory dues and fees, it gave inadequate consideration to practi-
calities. It may fairly be stated that unions obtain full equivalent
dues and fees from dissenters with the certain knowledge and in-
tention that a portion of such funds will be utilized for non-
collective bargaining purposes-purposes opposed by the payer.
As unions have full control over their own accounting practices,
they can readily and conveniently ensure that records accurately
establishing the amount of non-collective bargaining expenditures
are never created. If such unions are safeguarded from injunctive
relief upon the collection of dues, they are necessarily granted the
power to substantially defeat dissenters' claims with regard to dues
misuse, as the records establishing that misuse simply will not
exist, or they will at most reveal only gross approximations.
In an analogous political spending context, the Supreme Court
has recently given clear indication that it recognizes the necessity
of injunctive relief. In Cort v. Ash,'' stockholders complained of
corporate political contributions having been made without their
20 When an employee recovers amounts wrongfully withheld from him in
violation of the FLSA by a private suit, he is awarded a liquidated penalty as
high as 100% of the actual damages, and his attorneys' fees. 29 U.S.C. S 216(b)
(1970).
1367 U.S. at 771; 373 U.S. at 119-20.
211421 U.S. 66 (1975).
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consent. During the course of its opinion, the Court devoted con-
siderable attention to the restrictions upon union political spend-
ing set forth in the Federal Corrupt Practices Act,1' particularly
as such spending relates to compulsory contributors:
We note that Congress did show concern, in permanently expand-
ing § 610 to unions, with protecting union members from use of
their funds for political purposes. (citation omitted). This differ-
ence in emphasis may reflect a recognition that, while a stockholder
acquires his stock voluntarily, and is free to dispose of it, union
membership and the payment of union dues, is often involuntary
because of union security and check-off provisions. 1
Although recovery was denied in this instance because of the pre-
emptive operation of state law, the Court specifically pointed out
the injury suffered by one whose compulsory funds are utilized for
political purposes he opposes:
Recovery of derivative damages by the corporation for violation of
§ 610 would not cure the influence which the use of corporate
funds in the first instance may have had on a federal election.
Rather, such a remedy would only permit directors in effect to
'borrow' corporate funds for a time; the latter compelled repayment
might well not deter the initial violation, and would certainly not
decrease the impact of the use of such funds upon an election
already past. 14
The rationale of the foregoing quotation applies with full force
to union political spending, and it clearly establishes the existence
of irreparable harm which can be avoided only by the issuance of
appropriate injunctive relief.
Another court has ventured somewhat closer to issuing an in-
junction foreclosing the collection of compulsory fees from public
school teachers."1 After reiterating the precautionary statement
in Allen that an injunction ought not to be granted dissenters "in
the absence of special circumstances, ' '.. the court went on to rule
that such special circumstances "would exist if either the amount
212 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970).
213 421 U.S. at 81.
214 Id. at 82.
21I Robbinsdale Educ. Ass'n v. Robbinsdale Fed'n of Teachers, Local 872,
239 N.W.2d 437 (Minn.), vacated sub nom. Threlkeld v. Robbinsdale Fed'n of
Teachers, Local 872, 97 S. Ct. 225 (1976).
26 373 U.S. at 120.
19761
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
of the fee, or the circumstances surrounding its assessment, clearly
indicate that the fee is invalid or unconscionable under the statu-
tory provisions......
No further light was shed as to criteria of "invalidity" or "un-
conscionability," but it requires no strain to so characterize com-
pulsory dues and fees which are extracted over an employee's pro-
test and expend upon activities whose support from compulsory
funds, over objection, has been unequivocally condemned by the
Supreme Court.
C. Union Rebate Procedures
Confronted with exposure to costly litigation which, among
other consequences, may entail the disclosure of a great deal of in-
formation they would prefer to keep to themselves, unions have
attempted to persuade courts to relinquish jurisdiction of spend-
ing claims in favor of the forum and remedy provided by internal
rebate plans. The specific doctrine urged in support of this disposi-
tion is that of exhaustion of internal union remedies. The results
have been mixed: union success in Reid, and defeat in Ellis and
Seay. 2
18
Each union's rebate procedure is susceptible to criticism based
upon the particular mechanical structure associated with it, as well
as other factors affecting its implementation and computations of
expenditures conducted pursuant to the procedure. Space does not
permit discussion of these points, and in any event, they are of
far less importance than the conceptual shortcomings of rebate
plans.
As applied to union expenditures having significant First
Amendment sensitivity, chiefly those associated with political ac-
tivities or other highly ideological undertakings such as organizing
efforts, the controversy as to whether rebate plans are a judicially
cognizable remedy should be resolved with finality on one simple
basis-the subsequent rebate of compulsory funds misspent on
those activities cannot undo the constitutional infringement worked
by the expenditure in the first instance."1' Political and ideological
viewpoints once promulgated, and political influence once applied,
217 239 N.W.2d at 444.
21891 L.R.R.M. 2339; 533 F.2d 1126.
2 I Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996, 1004 (9th Cir. 1970).
COMPULSORY UNION DUES
cannot be withdrawn from the marketplace of ideas, the legisla-
tive chamber, or the polling booth.
The impetus for the adoption of rebate plans may be traced
to a suggestion in Allen that:
If a union agreed upon a formula for ascertaining the proportion
of political expenditures in its budget, and made available a simple
procedure for allowing dissenters to be excused from having to pay
this proportion of moneys due from them under the union-shop
agreement, prolonged and expensive litigation might well be
averted."
Promulgation of union rebate plans is compatible with neither the
express language nor the Court's intent. The extra-judicial resolu-
tion suggested by the Court depended upon unions ceasing to
collect political monies from dissenters, not upon the establish-
ment of a procedure whereby dissenters would be forced to submit
their complaints of misspending to a union-established procedure
yielding a controlled result.
The assertion that dissenters may be denied a judicial forum
and compelled to participate in an internal union rebate plan runs
directly against the grain of binding Supreme Court authority. In
Granite State,"' it was made absolutely clear that unions have no
power over nonmembers to bind them to internal union processes.
The Reid decision," ' which consigned nonmembers to the exhaus-
tion of an internal union rebate program, is flatly incompatible
with the Granite State holding. Reid is further anomalous for its
failure to recognize established federal labor policy. If a union
member's claim is' met with the contention that exhaustion of in-
ternal remedies should be required, the court has discretion to
compel that result; but pursuit of the internal union procedure
may not be required for more than four months. 3 This limitation
on exhaustion requirements was, of course, mandated by Congress
because implementation of the exhaustion doctrine had led to the
following results: "[T]he only real assistance to the system from
the intra-union remedies exhaustion requirement results from its
220 373 U.S. at 123.
'21NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
22 479 F.2d 517.
2'229 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1970).
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ability to wear down the employee and discourage him from fur-
ther pursuit of his claim. 224
It is repugnant to common sense to suggest that an exhaustion
requirement which Congress found too abusive to be inflicted upon
persons choosing union membership could nevertheless be utilized
to defeat or hinder the claims of those rejecting all ties with the
union. Nevertheless, awareness of this anomaly has escaped some
courts.
Any requirement that dissenters resort to internal union rebate
procedures violates the burden of proof allocation established in
Allen. As the union determines the extent of its political expendi-
tures, any challenge to that determination necessarily transfers the
burden of proof directly to the dissenter. An allusion to that point
is made in the Seay H decision, but the court avoided its resolu-
tion. 2
25
Tempestuous argument has been raised with regard to the pro-
priety of allowing a union to make a determination of the spending
grievances asserted against it by dissenters. The Reid court in-
dulged a presumption that the defendant union would fairly and
regularly make the determination of political expenditures and re-
bate accurate amounts to dissenters. There is certainly no parallel
authority in the common law presuming that a judge passing upon
his own case could do so with legally cognizable effect. In fact,
the notion that unions are empowered to resolve claims "of the
utmost [constitutional] gravity 2' asserted against them by dis-
senters stands in solitary exception to hundreds of years of authori-
ties invalidating the attempted exercise of judicial authority by
one having personal involvement in the controversy.2 1
Recent decisions have made some progress in undoing the mis-
chief of the Reid result. The Ninth Circuit, confronted by a trial
court ruling in conformity with the Reid decision, refused to follow
the same path. Although it held that the case before it was "on all
fours"2 8 with Reid, the court found that exhaustion of the internal
"
24Dorn v. Meyers Parking System, 395 F. Supp. 779, 784 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
21533 F.2d at 1132.
226 Street, supra note 1, 367 U.S. at 749. International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
227Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (1610); In re Murchison, 349 U.S.
133, 136 (1955); cf. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
2 2
1 Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 533 F.2d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 1976).
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union procedure "imposes an intolerable burden on plaintiffs. ' 2.
The court left it up to the trial judge to determine whether or not
the internal procedure was fair and adequate, but it is difficult to
envision an affirmative answer to that inquiry, in the face of the
remainder of the appellate decision.
Only one other spending suit has involved a determination of
the legal effect to be attributed an internal union rebate plan.
BRAC, the defendant in Ellis, had instituted a constitutional pro-
vision in 1967 providing for a reduction in dues of two cents per
member per month upon request, which amount was to represent
amounts ordinarily paid to the Grand Lodge Legislative Fund
Account. Nevertheless, in the same constitution, it was provided
that not less than fifteen cents per member per month be channeled
to a State Legislative Committee." In 1971, the reduction was
increased to three and one-third cents per month, and the State
Legislative Committee payment increased to thirty cents. These are
the provisions which the Ellis court found "were not good faith
efforts to comply with [the union's] lawful obligations."" Two
subsequent internal rebate changes were made, increasing the
scope of rebatable expenditures. On the strength of Reid and the
trial court decision in Seay,"' termination of the litigation was un-
successfully sought.
Immediately on the heels of the Ellis decision, it was reported
that:
A recent union defeat in court prompts AFL-CIO political chiefs
to advise unions to adopt rebate systems so members who dissent
from union political stands can get back the portion of their dues
spent on politics. 33
This recommendation may go unheeded. The adoption and an-
nouncement of rebate plans call attention to unions" political in-
volvement, and the offer to return funds expended for politics
may be felt to have unsavory connotations. At minimum, it obli-
gates unions to process claims, and refund dues, to a large number
"Id. at 1130 note 6. Id. at n.6.
23 Exhibits F and H to Amendment to Complaint, Ellis v. BRAC, No.
73-113-N (S.D. Cal. filed Mar. 20, 1974).
211 91 L.R.R.M. at 2343.
232 Supra note 6.
23 Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1976, at 1, col. 5.
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of dissenters who would otherwise never resort to litigation. If the
paramount purpose for the implementation of such plans is to
secure an exit from such litigation, that objective has been sub-
stantially jeopardized by the Seay I decision. If a union must go
through a full trial under any circumstances, the existence of an
internal rebate procedure does little more than to portray the
union's good intentions-a portrayal which may be inconsistent
with other union actions, such as ignoring protests.
X. CONCLUSION
In 1958 legislation was proposed which would have permitted
a compulsory contributor to file a petition with the Secretary of
Labor requesting that his payments be expended only for collec-
tive bargaining. The Secretary was authorized to investigate and
prosecute violations, and the amounts recovered were to be paid
to the petitioning employee!' This measure was rejected by a
significant margin in the Senate'" and there is little reason to an-
ticipate more cordial congressional treatment in the near future.
In the absence of meaningful statutory reform, rigorous litiga-
tion relief is an unavoidable necessity if the courts have a sincere
interest in ensuring the exercise of dissenters' rights. Even if
punitive damages and liberal attorneys' fees are awarded, few
employees will be able to secure the financial resources and legal
expertise essential to successful prosecution of a spending suit.
The infringement of workers' rights accomplished by misspend-
ing compulsory dues and fees is rooted directly in the exclusive
representation device. If Congress were to carefully review the
history and the effects of the present statutory schemes, it would be
forced to conclude that releasing millions of employees from sub-
ordination to an unwanted union representative would largely re-
solve a tremendous range of societal conflicts that continually
plague the courts without judicial intervention. A union obliged
to represent only its adherents would not face a "free rider"
problem.
Finally, it is entirely appropriate that Congress give American
working people due credit for intelligence and common sense.
234 104 CONG. REC. 11330 (1958).
" 'd. at 11347 (by a 51 to 31 vote).
COMPULSORY UNION DUES
If an employee needs- or wants a union, he should be at liberty to
join and be represented by whichever labor organization he selects.
If he prefers to be a "rugged individualist," there is no factually
supportable thesis for refusing him this alternative. This conse-
quence may well follow in the absence of statutory revision. The
Eighth Circuit has held that a challenge to the exclusive repre-
sentation scheme, as applied to public employees, raises a "sub-
stantial federal constitutional question...... Resolution of that ques-
tion in favor of the plaintiff-employees will almost certainly exert
a comparable effect upon private sector employment, as the hand
of government has forcefully extended exclusive representation
privileges to private sector unions.
2 Knight v. Alsop, 535 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1976).
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